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I. Introduction 
This cumulative dissertation develops and applies methods to predict and empirically 
study financial market behavior. It presents three papers examining different research 
questions on the economic and statistical laws governing financial markets. Despite 
the variation in contexts, a common theme is developing robust prediction models for 
the questions at hand. The underlying motivation is to support sound decision-making, 
by identifying the most important forces at work in a given system, extracting the 
most powerful predictive features from the data, and combining them in a well-
specified algorithm. In sum, this work is as much on building robust predictive 
models as it is on solving the specific research questions on financial market behavior. 
Each of the three studies has been motivated by questions arising in different 
contexts of my business career. Working part-time on the dissertation for over nine 
years provided opportunities to approach financial markets from different angles: First 
as a management consultant focusing on risk management in financial institutions, 
second as co-founder of a quantitative asset management firm, and third as an 
entrepreneur developing data analytics solutions for decision-making. 
The first study, Improving Performance of Corporate Rating Prediction 
Models by Reducing Financial Ratio Heterogeneity, develops a methodology to 
construct better performing models to predict credit default rates of large corporations 
across different industries. It was motivated by the fact that our consulting team had 
difficulties to construct rating models for large corporates, due to limited available 
data on defaults and heterogeneity in financial ratios across industry groups. 
Published work did not provide much methodological help. This motivated 
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developing our own methodology to account for industry heterogeneity within the 
rating model, and thereby achieving a notable improvement in prediction accuracy. 
The second paper, Exploiting Attention-driven Mispricing: Evidence from 
Actual-Dollar Trading, develops a systematic trading strategy for U.S. stocks and 
successfully trades it in a true out-of-sample test with real money. These results not 
only motivated investors to provide the seed funding to start a quantitative asset 
management firm, it also posed the question of how these profits could be possible 
and persistent for a longer period. Given that the widely accepted efficient market 
hypothesis (Fama, 1970) implies that financial markets eliminate such profit 
opportunities quickly, this conflicting observation deserved further investigation. 
Third and finally, the essay High Frequency Trading Intensifies Intraday 
Extreme Events in Stock Returns investigates whether high frequency trading (HFT) 
activity exacerbates large intraday price moves in the stock market. The idea of 
investigating the link between HFT and intraday extreme events was motivated by my 
intraday market observations from countless hours of automated trading surveillance. 
Thereby, sudden bursts of activity and volatility – often without any news – were a 
surprisingly regular phenomenon. At the same time, there is a dichotomy in the 
literature. On the one hand, several published empirical studies indicate that HFT 
activity dampens volatility and improves market quality. On the other hand, 
theoretical models and institutional traders formulate multiple plausible mechanisms 
by which HFT could cause extreme events in short-term stock returns.  
Overall, although the contexts and topics have changed considerably over 
time, all papers share an underlying research motivation: obtain a better understanding 
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of the economic and statistical laws governing the behavior of financial markets, and 
to do so, build “good models” that derive these laws from empirical data. Ultimately, 
the aim of all analysis is to make sound decisions. Across the three studies, working 
towards this goal has led to shared methodology and techniques. The next sections of 
this introduction will present these commonalities and summarize the three essays in 
the context of these themes and their contributions to their respective bodies of 
literature. The introduction concludes with overarching learnings on financial market 
behavior from the three papers. The core of this dissertation in sections II to IV 
contains the actual essays. Section V discusses their contributions in light of new 
publications in their fields and derives implications for further research. 
1. Building Robust Predictive Models 
A good model has statistically significant predictive power out-of-sample. Not only 
does it fit well the empirical data it has been developed and trained on, but it also 
stays robust when making predictions on new data. This determines whether a model 
can support real-world decisions. This section presents a result-focused framework 
which subsumes the most important requirements defined in prior literature.1 
Thereby, achieving predictive power and achieving robustness are the main goals. 
                                                 
1 Academic literature and published comments by researchers offer several related frameworks of the 
characteristics and requirements of best practice empirical models. For instance, Chipperfield (2013) proposes 
the criteria fit, predictivity, parsimony, and sanity. While the first two essentially subsume the outcomes of 
predictive power and robustness on new data, the latter two represent key requirements to achieve these 
outcomes. Parsimony calls for selecting the simplest well-performing model, which supports robust out-of-
sample performance as well as traceability of the model variables and parameters. Sanity requires a well-
specified model in terms of using a link function or classification algorithm which fits the data and the 
phenomenon to be modeled. Furthermore, a “sane” model ensures that all assumptions by the chosen 
methodology be met. In addition, researchers should apply common sense to exclude nonsensical results. In an 
extensive survey, Kuntz et al. (2013) extract requirements for decision models in a large survey of literature as 
well as expert panels. They categorize requirements into structure, data, consistency/validation, and 
communication. Structure requires to pick the right classification algorithm for the problem, and to assure that all 
assumptions are met. Data includes the choice of appropriate modeling samples, specification of parameters as 
well as factor transformation (e.g. winsorizing variables). Consistency/validation calls for building on 
established learnings and principles from previous studies, as well as predictive validity of the model out-of-
sample. Communication requires traceability and parsimony of the model, as well as transparency through 
thorough description and documentation of a model. 
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Both goals pose several key requirements. These criteria represent by no means a 
comprehensive checklist of how to build a good model; rather, the aim is to illustrate 
the most important drivers to achieve robust predictive performance. 
1.1. Predictive Power 
Achieving predictive power requires specifying the right model structure and 
classification algorithm, and adapting it to the task environment by extracting 
significant predictors from the data and using or optimizing statistical circumstances 
and properties to increase statistical power. 
Correctly-specified structure / prediction algorithm – choosing the right 
prediction algorithm or link function is a key driver of model performance. The first 
task is not to make an artisanal error in model specification. For example, if the 
dependent variable is bounded by zero, simple linear regression might not be the right 
algorithm, as it could predict negative values. Instead, a logistic link function might 
be appropriate (see e.g. Chipperfield, 2013). Furthermore, the algorithm should make 
reasonable assumptions about the data. For instance, a common pitfall in time-series 
regression is that significances of parameters are biased upwards if errors are auto-
correlated. This problem can be solved by adjusting the regression specification (e.g. 
by adding lagged dependent variables) or might require more advanced model types. 
The second task is choosing an algorithm with superior capability to learn the laws of 
the system we study. If relationships between our independent predictors and our 
variable of interest are significantly different from linear, ordinary linear regression 
will at best return imprecise estimates. Linearizing predictor variables (e.g. through 
log-transformation) might fix this, or we might have to switch to a different algorithm 
altogether. In conclusion, the assumptions implied by our choice of model type should 
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fit to the data and the system we study (or at least not be too strongly violated), and 
the algorithm has to be able to capture the underlying relationships. 
Adapted to task environment – Todd & Gigerenzer (2000), who study the 
performance of decision heuristics2 in different environments, define a well-adapted 
model as ecologically rational, in that it fits its use of information and logic to the 
information structure in the environment. First of all, this means using underlying 
laws of information in the system we study to extract powerful predictors. To 
illustrate, assume we have to solve the question which of two randomly picked cities 
is the larger one. An ecologically rational predictor variable would be to ask whether 
we know the cities. If we only know one of the two, this indicates the larger city with 
a high accuracy. This concept is powerful because mere recognition of a city is highly 
correlated to the many cues that predict city size: have we heard from it in the news, 
does the city have a renowned university? All these criteria are correlated to city size 
and are partly subsumed by the simple predictor. It is powerful because it fits the 
structure of the socio-economic system it tries to predict. Next to the definition of 
good predictive factors from available data, a good model uses the statistical 
circumstances to its advantage. For instance, Fama & Macbeth (1973), in their 
seminal paper on estimating equity risk premia with a two-step regression, make use 
of the fact that estimates of second moments (variances and co-variances) need much 
less data than the first moment (the mean) to converge towards small confidence 
intervals (Chacko et al., 2014). The procedure is still used by researchers today (see 
e.g. Barinov, 2015; Conrad et al., 2015; Khovansky & Zhylyevskyy, 2013). In sum, 
adaptation to the task environment can be done in two ways: fundamentally, we can 
                                                 
2 Todd and Gigerenzer focus on the performance of heuristics; however, since every heuristic is a simple model of 
the system it is applied in, the implications apply for our discussion of models as well. 
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define powerful predictive factors which exploit the information structure of the 
system we study; statistically, we can utilize the properties of the underlying data and 
mathematical laws to our advantage. 
1.2. Achieving Robustness 
A robust model performs well out-of-sample. Facing new data, it makes right 
predictions on average, because it has generalized the most relevant laws of its task 
environment. There are two drivers of out-of-sample robustness: first, ensuring 
parsimony and simplicity during model construction, and second, performing validity 
and robustness checks to evaluate candidate and final models. 
Parsimony and simplicity – when we face the choice between two models 
with approximately the same explanatory power, we should always choose the 
simpler one (Chipperfield, 2013). However, this is easier said than done: a researcher 
fitting an algorithm to a data sample achieves subsequently better measures of 
predictive power for each additional variable included in the model. Eventually, this 
results in overfit. Then, a model’s measured predictive power on the estimation 
sample overstates what it can realistically achieve facing new data. Each new free 
parameter allows describing the underlying laws of the studied environment in more 
detail; at the same time it accounts for more of the specific characteristics of 
individual observations. At some point, the model is less driven by the general 
behavior but by “knowledge” on how best to accommodate the noise the data sample. 
When applied in the real world, the latter rules in the model are detrimental to out-of-
sample predictive power. Figure 1 illustrates this effect: focusing on the most relevant 
factors tends to provide more robust performance. This is also an ecologically rational 
I. Introduction 
I-7 
strategy: the most important factors in an environment have the highest likelihood to 
stay important (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000) 
Figure I-1: In-and out-of-sample predictive power, as a function of the number of free 
parameters 
 
 
Achieving parsimony and simplicity during in-sample model development can 
be achieved in multiple ways. First we can consciously stop early when adding new 
predictors which only marginally improve model performance. Second, we can use 
advanced algorithms for feature selection which penalize too many free parameters 
(see e.g. Tian et al. (2015), who use the LASSO least absolute shrinkage and selection 
operator for variable selection). Third, we can use robustness checks during model 
development to “stress-test” whether an additional complication of a model adds 
value. 
Validity and robustness checks – One straightforward method to check for 
robustness is to use multiple sub-samples or cross-validation. Thereby we “train” the 
model on one part of the data, and reserve part of the population or sub-periods for 
Predictive
power
Number of factors
Predictive power 
increases with each 
additional factor Overfit
measured out-of-sample
measured in-sample
1 2 … N
Out-of-sample 
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validation tests of model performance. This allows detecting performance degradation 
as illustrated in Figure 1 above. Resampling algorithms such as bootstrapping provide 
an alternative. They simulate the process of obtaining new data samples and allow 
estimating confidence intervals for model parameters. If a researcher’s preferred 
model parameterization is an overfitted local optimum on the training sample, 
bootstrapping will show that performance is at the right hand side of the performance 
distribution. Ideally, we use the final hold-out or out-of-sample data only once; 
otherwise, we become guilty of data-snooping from testing too many variants of a 
model. Effectively, this turns an out-of-sample test into in-sample optimization, and 
we run the risk of building an overfitted model that fails in reality. In practice, it is 
very difficult to control whether a researcher did indeed use the out-of-sample test 
only once. Hence, data-snooping biases that lead to false positive empirical findings 
are a widely discussed topic in empirical research on financial markets (see e.g. 
Marshall et al., 2008; Park & Irwin, 2007). Again, advanced algorithms such as the 
Reality Check procedure by White (2000) and the Superior Predictive Ability test by 
Hansen (2005) provide ways to adjust for biases. They explicitly account for the 
overstatement of model performance resulting from data-snooping, by adjusting for 
the fact that many model variants have been tested to come up with one final solution. 
The next section of this chapter will discuss the three essays in the context of 
these criteria and summarize their contributions to their respective fields of research. 
2. Essay Contributions to their Fields and Robust Predictive 
Modeling 
Table I summarizes the methods used by the three studies, following the criteria to 
achieve robust predictive power outlined in the previous section. 
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Table I-1: Essay Modeling Approaches to achieve Predictive Power and Robustness 
Goals: Achieving Predictive Power Achieving Robustness 
Key 
requirements: 
 
Correctly-specified 
structure / predic-
tion algorithm 
Adapted to task 
environment 
Parsimony and 
simplicity 
Validity and 
robustness 
checks 
E.1 Rating 
       Prediction 
       across 
       Industries 
 Linear regression 
with nested logit 
sub-models for 
financial ratios 
 Heterogeneity score 
based adjustment 
for industry effects 
 Fundamental: factor 
selection guided by 
economic categories 
and intuition from 
financial statement 
analysis 
 Statistical: outlier 
protection via logistic 
factor transformation 
 One regression model 
covering 9 industry 
sectors with industry-
adjusted prediction 
factors 
 One procedure for all 
predictors: Box-Cox,  
heterogeneity score, 
logit transformation 
 Out-of-sample 
validation 
sample 
 Bootstrap 
validation of 
model 
performances 
E.2 Attention- 
       based 
       Trading 
       Strategy 
 Adaptive trading 
heuristic based on 
regression model 
 Fundamental: market 
capitalization as proxy 
for “noise trader” 
impact/profit 
potential 
 Trading heuristic with 
very few parameters 
 One regression term 
driving all entry and 
exit orders 
 Sensitivity test 
 Out-of-sample 
validation 
 Actual-dollar 
(!) trading 
E.3 HFT causes 
       Intraday 
       Extreme 
       Events 
       (IEE) 
 Use of exogenous 
shocks to isolate 
causal effect of HFT 
on IEE  
 Time/firm cluster 
heteroscedasticity 
adjusted std. errors 
 Fundamental/ 
statistical: day-time 
normalized volatility 
benchmark 
 Standard controls 
encompassing key 
drivers of volatility 
 Cross-
validation with 
sub-periods 
  
2.1. Essay 1 – Improving Performance of Corporate Rating 
Prediction Models by Reducing Financial Ratio Heterogeneity 
Chapter II – co-authored with Jan Hendrik Schmidt and Max Neukirchen – introduces 
an approach to measure and reduce group-level financial ratio heterogeneity in rating 
models for large multinational corporations. In our case, this heterogeneity stems from 
industry groups with significantly different balance and income sheet structure: every 
industry has different typical financial ratio values for a given credit risk category. 
Due to the limited number of large corporations available for model building, this 
heterogeneity poses a challenge. One the one hand, the sample is too small to 
construct separate rating models for individual industry groups; on the other hand, a 
“one-size-fits-all” model’s performance suffers from industry noise in the data. 
The heterogeneity reduction approach takes its power from a granular 
measurement of the industry-driven differences of relationships between financial 
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ratios and credit ratings. We minimize the sample-size weighted average of these 
measurements with an iterative procedure, by adding or subtracting an adjustment 
value for each industry group. We show that reducing this definition of financial ratio 
heterogeneity results in a rating prediction model with better performance than both 
unadjusted models and models adjusted by including industry dummies or other 
simpler procedures. 
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways: first, the heterogeneity 
approach fills a gap in cases where a limited dataset does not permit the construction 
of separate models for individual industries or regions. Second, while previous 
literature focused mostly on choosing the optimal classification algorithm, our paper 
shows that factor definition and factor transformation yield further performance 
increases. Furthermore, this framework of performance levers is a useful tool to help 
constructing optimal bankruptcy prediction models in general. 
Methodologically, the study showcases all criteria to achieve robust predictive 
power. The chosen classification algorithm is well suited for the task. We use linear 
regression with nested sub-models (e.g. logit and gaussian transformations) for each 
financial ratio. The linear link function predicts probabilities of defaults that have 
been linearized with a log-transformation. The second layer allows us to account for 
different kinds of non-linear relationships between a company’s financials and credit 
risk and at the same time takes care of outliers in financial ratio distributions. This 
outlier protection adapts the model to the task environment. For predicting credit risk, 
it is desirable to make a balanced assessment, analyzing different aspects of a 
company’s financials. Capping outliers ensures that no single variable takes too much 
weight in the regression results. Our approach to factor selection also contributes to 
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this goal: we perform an economic categorization of financial ratios and make sure 
that the most important categories are covered. In addition, we reduce multi-
collinearity by barring too many similar variables from entering the model. Together, 
all these techniques and methodology choices help achieving robustness. We are able 
to solve a challenging multi-industry prediction problem with a comparatively 
parsimonious regression model. The factor transformations – Box-Cox, heterogeneity 
reduction, and construction of non-linear sub-models – are uniformly applied. We 
employ multiple checks of validity and robustness. For all model candidates, we train 
the algorithm on a training sample, which comprises 80% randomly chosen 
observations, and then compare model performances out-of-sample on the remaining 
20%. Furthermore, with a bootstrapping test, we validate the performance 
improvement of the heterogeneity-score enhanced model versus alternatives from the 
literature. 
2.2. Essay 2 – Exploiting Attention-Driven Mispricing: Evidence 
from Actual-Dollar Trading 
This study – presented in full length in Chapter III – performs a real-life test of the 
efficient market hypothesis by Fama (1970), which suggests that it should be pointless 
to design a statistical trading strategy based on past data and expect to earn excess 
returns beyond a fair compensation for the risks of deviating from the market 
portfolio. We do exactly that. Not only does the study show that we can earn 
statistically significant trading profits, it does so out-of-sample with real money. 
Making real trades circumvents all needs to make assumptions about market frictions 
such as trading costs and short-selling constraints, which make up a significant part of 
the academic discussion around whether theoretical trading strategies can actually 
make economically significant profits (see e.g. Malkiel, 2003). 
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The trading strategy sells short U.S. stocks at market open on the day 
following a buy recommendation by Jim Cramer in the evening TV show ``Mad 
Money'' on CNBC. It exploits the published phenomenon of attention-driven buying 
by retail investors, whereby stock recommendations cause mispricings by drawing 
investor attention to stocks, although the recommendations themselves have zero 
information value. Hence, the initial price spike from a recommendation is typically 
reversed in full over several days. The trading strategy covers most positions 
profitably, with an average 0.53% return per trade, in the first half-hour of the day. 
Adjusting for common risk factors in the literature does not explain the excess returns.  
Further investigations into the source of the strategy’s profits show that 
intraday, recommended stocks exhibit a ``reversal-of-the-reversal'' pattern, i.e. after an 
initial correction of the mispricing, it re-widens temporarily. This intraday 
phenomenon is undocumented in the literature on attention and recommendation 
effects, and supports theories on limits to arbitrage and destabilizing speculation. The 
strategy captures these intraday dynamics better than an average market participant, 
suggesting excess returns from market timing. This constitutes out-of-sample 
evidence of market inefficiency, though by itself not economically large. 
Nevertheless, if the observed intraday patterns in stock returns were universal, they 
would represent a significant deviation from market efficiency. 
The strategy is also an example of robust predictive modeling used for real-life 
decision-making. The classification algorithm is a simple trading heuristic – with an 
entry rule, and a profit-target and stop-loss rule for exit – that uses one simple 
regression of mispricing size vs. stock size, measured by market capitalization. This 
simple feature, however, adapts the strategy very well to the task of predicting the 
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price impact of retail traders who react to stock recommendations: the smaller a stock, 
the higher the market share that these “noise traders” can take, and the higher the 
mispricing and profit potential for the trading strategy. The trading model is simple, 
with very few free parameters. After estimating the size of the mispricing as a 
function of company size, this prediction drives entry, profit-target and stop-loss 
strategies. For validation and robustness checks, we use two out-of-sample periods – 
one before and one after the training period. Having confirmed the model’s predictive 
power in out-of-sample simulation, we apply it for real-life trading decisions. What 
form of validation could be more powerful for a model than using it successfully in 
reality? 
2.3. Essay 3 – High Frequency Trading Intensifies Intraday 
Extreme Events in Stock Returns 
Chapter IV presents an investigation of the impact of high frequency trading (HFT) 
on intraday extreme events in U.S. stock returns. The influence of HFT on market 
characteristics, and whether HFT increases or decreases market quality, are disputed 
questions in the literature. Published empirical studies have typically found that, on 
average, HFT improves standard measures of market quality, such as average spread, 
volatility, and short-term autocorrelation of returns. On the other hand, the “Flash 
Crash” of May 6, 2010 is an event for which empirical investigations show that HFT 
has intensified selling pressure. Furthermore, numerous theoretical models as well as 
observations by market practitioners suggest mechanisms by which HFT could 
systematically cause or contribute to large short-term price moves, or intraday 
extreme events (IEE), in stock returns. We test for a causal relationship between HFT 
and IEE with a multi-year sample of 1-minute price and HFT activity data on all 
liquid U.S. stocks. The IEE measure effectively measures tail risk in the form of “X-
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sigma events”, comparing intraday price moves with a measure of a stock’s daytime-
adjusted typical volatility. We isolate the causal effect of HFT on IEE with an 
instrumental variable regression, using exogenous shocks to HFT activity as 
instruments. Regulation NMS (summer 2007) acts as a positive shock to HFT activity, 
whereas the SEC Naked Access Ban (winter 2011/2012) constitutes a negative shock. 
Across both sub-periods, we find that HFT activity exacerbates intraday extreme 
events with statistical and economic significance. These results add empirical 
evidence to the debate among researchers, market participants and regulators about 
the benefits and drawbacks of HFT. Currently, investors “pay” for the benefits of HFT 
market participation by having to bear larger short-term tail risks in stock returns. For 
non-HFT investors, this increases adverse-selection and hedging costs. 
This paper closely follows the framework of predictive and robust modeling. 
Using an instrumental variable approach in a panel regression framework disentangles 
the endogeneity of HFT. Are high frequency traders active because the market is 
volatile, or do they cause the volatility? Using instrumental variables is also a risky 
approach. Numerous assumptions have to hold for results to be viable. Since we 
cannot be 100% sure that our assumptions are correct, we use two sub-periods with 
two different instruments for cross-validation. Another risk in the panel regression is 
heteroscedasticity across firms and time, which we address by using double-clustered 
standard errors in all regressions. The measure of intraday extreme events 
incorporates a lot of our previous knowledge about intraday volatility: it is highly 
different across stocks and daytime. Calculating a stock- and daytime-specific 
benchmark of what constitutes “extreme”, we obtain an IEE measure that is highly 
consistent across stock size classes and time. These are desirable properties for our 
task of investigating the marginal impact of HFT activity. Next to HFT and IEE, the 
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regressions stay very simple, using only standard control variables from the HFT 
literature. Apart from control variables, we test for robustness with specification 
changes and through the above-mentioned cross-validation across multiple periods. 
This comes as close as we can get to a true out-of-sample test. 
3. Overarching Learnings on Financial Market Behavior 
Beyond individual contributions to respective literatures and the application of robust 
predictive modeling principles, the three studies yield several overarching insights on 
the laws governing financial markets: the importance of firm size, the existence of 
pockets of market inefficiency and the fact that agent interaction effects can trump 
fundamentals in determining asset prices, at least in the short-term. 
The importance of firm size is universal across all three prediction problems 
and their respective literatures. In essay 1, firm size, measured by the book value of 
equity or assets, enters every credit rating model with the highest weight. This makes 
sense as size proxies for diversification and economic resilience. A large firm which 
is active in multiple products, markets, and geographies with a large and diverse asset 
base can withstand economic shocks much more than a small firm with little reserves 
and concentrated income streams. Numerous other sources (e.g. Režňáková & Karas, 
2014; Tian et al., 2015) in the rating literature confirm this finding. In essay 2, firm 
size – this time measured by market capitalization – influences every trading decision 
in the strategy from entry to exit. Again, this makes sense given what we know about 
asset pricing: size is one of three factors in the seminal paper by Fama & French 
(1992). In our case size proxies inversely for the relative market share which retail 
noise traders can achieve in a stock, and thereby drives our profit potential. In essay 3, 
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size enters the arena again in the form of market capitalization. Along with size, 
measures of volatility, liquidity and trading volume vary systematically. 
Consequently, so differ the effects of HFT that we seek to measure. We adopt the 
approach from prior studies, cutting the universe of stocks into size terciles (small, 
medium, and large), and confirm substantial differences in HFT activity by firm size. 
Pockets of market inefficiency exist in financial markets are partly linked to 
the third notion, that agent interactions can trump fundamentals. In essay 2, we 
show that retail noise traders create a profit opportunity that is systematically 
exploitable, with economically significant profits. Theories of agent interaction – in 
this case, between noise traders following positive-feedback strategies, and 
arbitrageurs who attempt to profit from an apparent mispricing – provide a potential 
explanation why the pattern remains exploitable for a longer period. In addition, we 
find a “reversal-of-the-reversal” pattern, i.e. a temporary re-widening of the 
mispricing. This supports theoretical models of destabilizing speculation by De Long 
et al. (1990) and underlines the need for arbitrageurs to synchronize their market-
impacting trades to successfully correct mispricings. (Abreu & Brunnermeier, 2002). 
When arbitrageurs fail, positive feedback traders can drive prices further away from 
fundamentals, forcing arbitrageurs to liquidate their positions at a loss, whereas in the 
long-term, the market would reward the opposite transaction. In such a trading 
environment, it can be a rational strategy to trade against fundamentals, leading to a 
re-widening the mispricing. This is exactly what the trading strategy in essay 2 does 
by existing its short-sales early – it buys back stocks although the mispricing has only 
been partially corrected. Although contrary to fundamentals, the action is rational as it 
preempts the same move from other arbitrageurs. What we learn from the trading 
strategy’s profitability is that these agent interactions create at least a pocket of 
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exploitable market inefficiency. Patterns created by interaction of short-term traders 
are stable enough to construct a model for market timing and apply it successfully in 
the market. Further research would be required to show that this is universal.  
Essay 3 also supports the view that agent interaction effects can trump 
fundamentals in the short-term. It shows that there are short-term market phases in 
which high frequency traders contribute to outsized short-term price moves. While we 
cannot differentiate whether these intraday extreme events are created by one HFT, 
the interaction of several HFT or the interaction of HFT and non-HFT participants, 
one aspect stays constant: highly sophisticated players in the market employ strategies 
driving prices away from fundamentals. In combination, essays 2 and 3 suggest that 
several mechanisms exist that can drive asset prices away from fair value – sometimes 
the source are retail traders, sometimes institutions operating at the margin of 
technical and analytical sophistication. As shown in essay 2, some of these 
phenomena give rise to trading opportunities which are economically and statistically 
significant, and hence, constitute instances of market inefficiency. 
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Abstract 
We introduce a new approach to improve the performance of rating prediction models 
for multinational corporations.  In this segment, the low number of defaults poses a 
challenge, as it prevents rating models to be constructed for individual industry 
sectors or regions.  We show that reducing group-level heterogeneity in financial 
ratios results in a rating prediction model with better performance than both 
unadjusted models and models adjusted by including industry dummies or other 
simpler procedures.  Our approach fills a gap in cases where a limited dataset does not 
permit the construction of separate models for individual industries or regions. 
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Abstract 
This study trades actual dollars in U.S. stocks during the day following a buy 
recommendation by Jim Cramer in the evening TV show “Mad Money” on CNBC. 
Prior papers show that Cramer's stock picks have no information value, yet induce 
attention-driven buying by retail investors, causing mispricings which disappear over 
several weeks. The trading strategy sells short stocks at market opening after the 
recommendation and covers most positions profitably in the first half-hour of the day. 
Profits are statistically significant and average 0.53% per trade. Common risk factors 
do not explain the returns. Intraday, we find that the mispricing is not corrected by a 
monotonous price decline as suggested by previous literature on recommendation 
effects. Instead, we find that the initial down-move is reversed by a significant 
transitory increase. This re-widening of mispricing supports theories on limits to 
arbitrage and destabilizing speculation. The strategy captures this intraday pattern 
better than an average market participant, suggesting excess returns from market 
timing. However, due to its small size, this is a small deviation from market 
efficiency. In sum, the business of exploiting mispricing seems risky and competitive. 
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1. Introduction 
This study started in an unusual way for a financial economics paper. It started 
as a practical project with the primary goal to make money – by developing a 
statistical arbitrage strategy and trading it with real capital. However, beyond greed, 
there was an underlying research motivation relating to financial economics: it was to 
disprove friends, co-workers and the majority of market efficiency literature arguing 
that the market is so efficient that it should be pointless to try to predict future stock 
returns based on past information which should already be reflected in market prices 
(Fama, 1970). It should be pointless to design a statistical trading strategy based on 
past data and expect to earn excess returns beyond a fair compensation for risks such 
as investing in small firms (see e.g. Chan & Chen, 1988). Hence the practical project 
did have a relevant underlying research question:  
Can an ex-ante-specified trading rule earn excess returns in an out-of-
sample test using actual dollars in the stock market? 
We start by summarizing the practical project of developing and trading the 
statistical arbitrage strategy. Then we investigate the results and observations and link 
them to existing literature. The trading strategy builds on a working paper by 
Engelberg et al. (2006) (hereafter ESW), who study the reactions of stocks after 
recommendations by Jim Cramer in the popular evening TV show “Mad Money” on 
CNBC (hereafter Cramer events). They find a significant “spike-reversal pattern” 
with abnormal returns on the day following the recommendation – 5.19% for the 
smallest quartile of stocks – which disappear within 12 trading days. ESW also find 
that statistical arbitrageurs respond, with high short-sales volume in the opening 
minutes following the recommendations. However, without data on stock loan fees 
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and transaction costs, they do not conclude whether significant predictability also 
allows earning excess returns. 
ESW’s findings motivated investigating Cramer events with the aim of 
earning real profits. We use data on prior Cramer events and daily Open, High, Low, 
Close prices and Volume of recommended stocks from July 2005 to October 2006. 
We predict the overnight price impact to sell short attractive events at the Open price 
on the day following the recommendation (hereafter trading day). The strategy closes 
(buys to cover) its short positions on the same day, either via a profit-taking limit 
order (below the entry price), a trailing stop-buy order (initially above the entry price, 
then moving down with price) or at market close. With a simulated Sharpe ratio of 
3.05 in the in-sample period and successful robustness tests across subperiods, our 
group of investors decided to put real money at stake. During the live trading period 
from December 2006 to July 2007, the strategy has entered 68 short positions with an 
average size of approximately US-$174,000, earning a cumulative unleveraged net 
return of 36.3% with a Sharpe ratio of 3.30 (see Table 2). Clearly, actual-dollar trades 
confirm ex-ante simulation. Against the null-hypothesis of not trading, the average 
profit per trade of 0.53% is significant at the .001 level. 
These results show significant, economically exploitable return predictability, 
generated out-of-sample with an ex-ante-specified trading rule. However, do these 
profits also constitute excess returns? To investigate this, we regress the strategy’s 
weekly returns against contemporaneous returns for main risk factors in the market 
efficiency literature. We use the results in Bolster & Trahan (2009) for validation, 
who find that Jim Cramer’s picks have exposure to Size, Value and Momentum, and 
high market betas. Since we short the recommendations we should find negative 
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coefficients on these risk factors. We find exactly that. However, we do find a 
significantly positive exposure to Reversal. This suggests that part of the strategy’s 
profits are a compensation for providing liquidity (Pástor & Stambaugh, 2003). Still, 
the share of profits explained is very small. Unexplained “Alpha” is the most 
significant coefficient by far. 
There are two possible interpretations of these unexplained profits: (1) the 
strategy indeed managed to earn excess returns, (2) a regression on daily or weekly 
returns is simply a too blunt tool to explain profits made intraday, which otherwise 
could be explained by risks. Unfortunately, we are not aware of a model of intraday 
expected returns in the literature. Nevertheless, we do know that the strategy is 
somewhat risky, since part of the strategy’s trades end with losses. To disentangle 
whether the strategy earned its profit from taking risks or from above-average market 
timing (“Alpha”), we analyze how the strategy navigates the intraday price paths of 
stocks. The strategy closes more than half of its trades during the first 20 minutes of 
the trading day, and more than two thirds in the first half-hour. Moreover, these short-
term trades are no less profitable than their longer-term counterparts. There is a bias 
towards triggering the profit target or the trailing stop-loss order very early in the day. 
This implies that stocks failing to fall enough to reach the profit target tend to reverse 
upwards to trigger the trailing stop-loss, rather than settling at some “fair value” price 
until market close. We test for this “reversal-of-the-reversal” pattern with intraday 
regressions on Cramer events and confirm its existence. As expected, for the first half-
hour of the trading day, we find that the size of the initial downtrend is associated 
with the initial mispricing. However, in the second half-hour, there is a significant 
tendency for the initial down-move to be reversed in a transitory up-move. In other 
words, there is a significant tendency for a re-widening of mispricing intraday. 
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The strategy navigated this complex pattern better than the average market 
participant. The expected profits of the assumed average arbitrageur on the first post-
event day amount to about 33.5% earned with a holding period of six and a half hours 
for the 68 observed trades. The strategy however, earns 36.3% with an average 
holding period of only 34 minutes. The strategy extracts additional profits from the 
intraday price path of stocks and thereby outperforms the average arbitrageur. This 
suggests that next to a premium for short-term liquidity provision, the strategy also 
earned excess returns from market timing. 
Taken together, our findings relate and contribute to several bodies of existing 
literature: (1) tests of market efficiency, (2) impact of stock recommendations and 
attention, and (3) limits to arbitrage. 
The first literature of interest comprises tests of market efficiency, return 
predictability, and the profitability of trading rules. Over time, the literature has 
developed at least four challenges, or tests, which a potential new “market anomaly” 
has to pass: (i) controlling for data-snooping bias, (ii) accounting for market frictions 
and (iii) micro-structure effects, and (iv) adjusting for known risk factors. An actual-
dollar out-of-sample test is rare in the literature1 and conveniently addresses the first 
three challenges. Ex-post studies suffer from the risk of data-snooping, i.e. that 
researchers incorporate their knowledge of market history in their choice of prediction 
model (Timmermann & Granger, 2004; Avramov & Chordia, 2006; Cooper et al., 
2005). A real-money out-of-sample test rules out this risk. The second and third 
challenges, micro-structure effects such as non-synchronous trading and bid-ask-
                                                 
1 We are not aware of any comparable study setup. Seasholes & Wu (2007) come close by observing other 
arbitrageurs profiting by trading against retail traders. 
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bounce (Amini et al., 2013) and market frictions such as trading costs and short-
selling constraints (Malkiel, 2003), are solved by actual-dollar trading as well: there is 
no risk of overly optimistic assumptions. Finally, our test of common risk factors 
finds that they explain only a small part of profits. With most risk factors in the 
literature ranging between 2 - 11% risk premium per annum (Asness et al., 2014), 
high intraday returns warrant further research as to their source. 
The second literature of interest studies recommendation effects and the 
impact of investor attention on asset prices. The reversal-of-the-reversal pattern is a 
new finding to the literature on recommendation effects2 as well as the body of papers 
on Cramer events in particular, such as ESW and others3. These studies consistently 
find abnormal returns which subside to zero after a few days, weeks or months. By 
and large, stock recommendations have no information value. Their only impact is a 
temporary mispricing. In the published version of their paper, Engelberg et al. (2012) 
causally link retail investors’ attention to the size of the mispricing after Cramer 
events, confirming empirically that retail traders are attention-driven “noise traders” 
(Barber & Odean, 2008). Thus, what noise traders pay as a price premium for 
following the recommendations provides the incentive for smart arbitrageurs to 
provide liquidity. Our results suggest two extensions to this view. First, our analysis 
of the strategy’s market timing implies competitive pressure among arbitrageurs. In 
our example, in addition to naïve investors, even the average arbitrageur paid part of 
our profits. Realizing our profits by buying back our short position early in the day 
                                                 
2 see e.g. Kerl & Walter  (2007), Busse & Green (2002), Liang (1999), Metcalf & Malkiel (1994), Wright (1994), 
and Barber & Loeffler (1993) 
3 see e.g. Bolster et al. (2012), Hobbs et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2011), Keasler & McNeil (2010), Lim & Rosario 
(2010), Bolster & Trahan (2009), Karniouchina et al. (2009), Neumann & Kenny (2007) and Engelberg et al. 
(2006). Going beyond the recommendation literature, there is a somewhat comparable finding by Kudryavtsev 
(2013), who find that intraday reversals on one day are reversed again on the following day. However, the 
average reversal found is only 7-8 basis points per day. 
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implies that later trades by other arbitrageurs occur – on average – at an inferior price 
and with less efficient use of capital. Second, the intraday re-widening of the 
mispricing increases the risks for arbitrageurs and indicates that it could be rational to 
speculate in the original direction of the mispricing, rather than against it. 
This notion leads us to the third literature of interest on limits to arbitrage, 
which investigates factors that deter arbitrageurs from correcting mispricings. In 
contrast to the theoretical arbitrageur who has unlimited capital to trade against noise 
traders, real-life arbitrageurs do not (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). If a price shock from 
noise traders is too large, arbitrageurs might fail to correct mispricings and be forced 
to liquidate their positions at a loss. This risk might deter arbitrageurs from trading 
against the mispricing. Abreu & Brunnermeier (2002) suggest that arbitrageurs have 
to join forces to correct a mispricing, and thereby incur “synchronization risk”. As a 
result, successful arbitrage requires timing the market, including the actions of other 
arbitrageurs. Our observations are consistent with these predictions. Many actual-
dollar trades were exited via stop-loss as additional demand increased the mispricing 
beyond the risk limit set by our group of investors (i.e. arbitrageurs failed to 
synchronize). Furthermore, if noise traders follow positive-feedback strategies and/or 
other arbitrageurs might be forced to liquidate, De Long et al. (1990) suggest it is 
rational to jump on the bandwagon, driving prices even further away from 
fundamentals. Our finding of a systematic tendency of the mispricing to re-widen 
intraday supports this. 
Next to its profitability, our trading experiment shows that the “business” of 
correcting mispricing is highly competitive and risky. 
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The outline of this paper as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset of Cramer 
events used in section 3 to develop the statistical arbitrage strategy. Section 4 presents 
the actual trading results and further investigations as to the source of profits. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Data 
The development of the statistical arbitrage strategy uses a sample of 983 Cramer 
events from July 28, 2005 to October 17, 2006 collected by the independent website 
YourMoneyWatch.com.4 For each recommendation, we gather historical stock prices 
(daily open, high, low and close prices, and volume) for the respective trading days 
30t  to 15t  around the recommendation day t , as well as stocks’ market 
capitalization from Yahoo! Finance. We remove 67 due to missing data, leaving a 
sample of 916 Cramer events for analysis. We split the sample to obtain out-of-
sample data for model validation. We chose the 393 Cramer events from January to 
July 2006 as in-sample dataset, leaving two out-of-sample datasets for analysis, with 
“out-of-sample I” containing 106 events from August 1, 2006 to October 17, 2006, 
and “out-of-sample II” comprising the remaining 417 observations from 2005.5 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that across periods, stock characteristics such as 
market capitalization and liquidity differ somewhat across subperiods, whereas price 
                                                 
4 While recommendations are also tracked on Jim Cramer’s affiliated website TheStreet.com, Engelberg et al. 
(2006) find that YourMoneyWatch.com applies higher standards in distinguishing what constitutes a “buy” 
recommendation versus merely positive mentions of a stock during the show. For instance, unconditional buy 
recommendations such as “this stock is a triple buy” are considered a buy, whereas conditional statements such 
as “I like the stock, but wait until it drops below $60” are excluded. 
5 From the perspective of a financial economist, the methodology used in the practical trading experiment is far 
from optimal. Developing a strategy for a group of wealthy individuals required some pragmatic short-cuts. The 
periods used for strategy development and trading are non-standard, i.e. not of uniform length, such as years or 
half-years, as they were driven by the time when data became available and the opportunity to present the 
strategy to several wealthy individuals and obtain capital to trade. As a result, actual trading does not use a 
constant amount of capital, as the investors increased their amount invested after the first profitable trades had 
increased their confidence in the strategy. Trades are overlapping in time and hence should not be treated as 
independent observations, since contemporaneous returns for the market or other risk factors could drive results. 
Nevertheless, the benefit of a realistic, unbiased out-of-sample test are worth a few methodological sacrifices. 
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and volatility are largely similar. Since the trading strategy uses logarithms of market 
capitalization in its formulas, these differences have little impact. 
Table III-1: Descriptive statistics for in-sample, “out-of-sample I” and “out-of-sample II” data 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for Cramer events (clear “buy” recommendations by Jim 
Cramer as documented by YourMoneyWatch.com) for stocks on the recommendation date t0, with the 
actual recommendation occurring later during the evening of the same day. All data have been 
provided by Yahoo! Finance. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily log. returns 
from t-19 to t0. Liquidity is defined as price times volume at the close of t0. 
 
3. Development of the Trading Strategy 
This section describes the strategy development performed before the start of actual 
trading on December 4, 2006. We start by analyzing the profit opportunity from 
Cramer events to derive the requirements for trading strategy design. The second 
subsection describes the strategy and its parameters, followed by the in-sample and 
out-of-sample simulation results in the last subsection. 
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3.1. Profit Opportunity in Cramer Events 
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the sequence of events and relevant 
variables used for modeling the trading strategy over the course of the event day t  and 
the following day 1t . The indicated price path shows the stylized reaction 
observable in stock prices after a Cramer event. The “Mad Money” show airs every 
weekday at 6 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, two hours after market close, during which 
Jim Cramer features one to five stocks per day as explicit “buy” recommendations. 
The results in ESW as well as other studies on recommendation effects (see above) 
show that these stocks reopen at a significantly higher price in 1t , as a result of 
orders entered by Cramer’s audience while the market was closed. 
Figure III-1: Sequence of events and relevant data points for modeling 
Notes: This figure shows a schematic overview of the sequence of events and relevant variables used 
for modeling the trading strategy. The indicated price path provides a typical example of stocks’ 
reaction to Cramer events. CPI  denotes the overnight price impact – defined as the opening ( 1tO ) to 
prior close ( tC ) return – of Cramer’s “Buy” recommendations, whereas PO  represents the maximum 
theoretical profit opportunity to a trader who shorts stocks at the open, and manages to cover the 
position at the day’s low price ( 1tL ). 
 
Therefore, the strategy hypothesis is to sell short at the opening price in 1t  
in the expectation of buying the stock back at a lower price once abnormal returns 
subside. Given the daily flow of new events, the strategy should exit positions no later 
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than at the close of 1t  to free up capital for incoming Cramer events on the 
following day. The historical daily opening ( O ), high ( H ), low ( L ) and closing ( C ) 
prices provide the vertices of a stock’s intraday price path; however, since the 
sequence of H  and L  is unknown, testable strategies have to be based on 
conservative assumptions. As a consequence, the only sure entry point for a short-sale 
is at 1tO . 
Two observable variables are of particular interest for understanding the 
structure of the profit opportunity, as shown in Figure 1: 
(1) The initial price impact caused by Cramer’s recommendation (further 
referred to as Cramer price impact, or CPI) is defined as the close-to-
open return 1/1  tt CO . 
(2) The profit opportunity (PO) is defined as 1/ 11  tt LO , and indicates the 
maximum profit attainable for a short-sale at the opening of the trading 
day, when achieving the optimal exit price.  
Results of a study by Zawadowski et al. (2006), who find a significant 
correlation between the size of intraday price spikes and the extent of subsequent 
reversals, lead us to believe that PO  should be a function of CPI . For the purpose of 
short-selling, this only makes sense if a Cramer event actually has a price impact 
greater than zero. Figure 2 shows the logarithmized scatter plot for PO  as a function 
of observed positive CPI  values. Indeed, CPI  and PO  are correlated. This allows 
isolating the events with attractive profit potential. For events with observed CPI  
below 1.0% (corresponding natural logarithm of approximately -4.6), PO  becomes 
economically unattractive to trade. 
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Figure III-2: Logarithms of profit opportunity (PO) vs. Cramer price impact (CPI), and 
economic “priority area” for trading 
Notes: The scatterplot is based on 741 Cramer events with 0>CPI  and 0>PO  from July 28, 2005, to 
October 17, 2006. The dotted box highlights events of higher economic significance (approx. 450 
events), for which expected 1.0%>PO , as given by the centered 50-event moving average of Ln(PO) 
values. The %-values on the secondary Y-axis indicate corresponding delogarithmized values for 
Ln(PO). This graph is shown “as-is” from the strategy development process.  
 
Engelberg et al. (2006) show that the impact of Cramer events varies 
substantially with firm size. Hence, we regress CPI  on stocks’ market capitalization  
( M ) to obtain an indication of expected CPI , as shown in Figure 3. As expected, 
small-capitalization stocks react more strongly to a Cramer recommendation than 
large capitalization stocks. Again, we prioritize economically attractive events by 
excluding stocks with a market capitalization above US-$10 billion, corresponding 
roughly to an expected CPI  of 1.0%. A simple logic to use these observations for an 
entry filter would be to short only those stocks with market capitalization   US-$10 
billion for which observed CPI  reaches at least its expected value eCPI , as given by 
the regression function shown in Figure 3. 
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 )),((*0.09660.2277= ,1, titei MLnLnCPI   (1) 
whereby tiM ,  is a stock’s market capitalization (in million US-$) for firm i  on 
day t , and eCPI  indicates the expected Cramer price impact in percent.6 This entry 
filter selects 209 of all 916 Cramer events for trading. 
Figure III-3: Cramer price impact (CPI) vs. logarithm of market capitalization, in US-$ millions 
Notes: Scatterplot is based on 916 Cramer events with available market capitalization data, from July 
28, 2005, to October 17, 2006. CPI is defined as 1/1  tt CO . The log-linear regression function is 
given in Eq. (1). The dotted box highlights selected events with higher economic attractiveness, for 
which market capitalization   US-$10 billion. This graph is shown “as-is” from the strategy 
development process. 
 
The next subsection discusses the development of the full trading rule and the 
simulation procedure to optimize its parameters. 
                                                 
6 The double logarithm of M  was chosen since CPI  vs. )(MLn  is still notably non-linear (see figure 3). 
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3.2. Trading Strategy Design 
A key requirement for the trading strategy was that it remained easy to operate when 
trading in a real brokerage account. Therefore we define a simple framework 
consisting of a maximum of four orders placed for each Cramer event in 1t  (further 
referred to as “trading day”). We enter positions with a sell limit order (1) for 
execution at market opening. If filled, we place a stop-buy order (2) as protection 
against large losses7, and a buy-limit order (3) for profit-taking. If neither of the two 
exit limits is triggered, we cover the position with a market order (4) at market close. 
Figure 4 provides a schematic overview of the different orders and price levels. 
Figure III-4: Overview of strategy entry and exit orders, and simulation variables 
Notes: This figure illustrates the main variables of the trading strategy. Based on Cramer event data, 
an estimate eCPI  of the Cramer price impact is calculated. If the following opening price 1tO  is at or 
above the entry limit EL , then a short position is assumed with 1= tOEP . Based on the risk parameter 
R , the stop-loss limit SL  is placed some distance above EP  (in live trading, this was implemented 
using a trailing stop order, which follows prices downwards to protect profits). The profit-taking limit 
PT  is set below EP  according to profit parameter P . If neither SL  or PT  are triggered during the 
trading day, the position is closed at 1tC . 
 
 
The limit prices for orders (1) to (3) are given by the following equations: 
                                                 
7 In live trading, we used the trailing stop functionality offered by the broker, indicated as (2b) in Figure 4. 
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(1) The entry limit price EL for the short-sale at the opening is 
  ,1*= 1,,1,   teititi CPICEL  (2) 
which is assumed to be executed at a realized entry price (EP) of 
1= tOEP  if 11   tt ELO  during the backtest simulation.  
(2) The stop-loss limit level SL  is placed at 
 ,
0.03
*1*= 1,1,1, 


  
tei
titi
CPI
REPSL  (3) 
 and it can be interpreted as a volatility-driven risk limit, using eCPI  as 
volatility estimate, whereby R  is a parameter for the desired level of 
risk, e.g. 1.5% on invested capital.8 In the simulation, if SLH t 1  we 
assume to exit the position at SL  plus transaction costs. 
(3) The profit-taking limit level PT  is given by  
   ,0.03*0.51*= 1,1,1,   teititi CPIPEPPT  (4) 
which is conceptually comparable to the stop-loss level, whereby P  
sets the distance to the entry price. During simulation, if PTLt <1 , we 
assume to cover the position at PT  plus transaction costs, but only if 
not SLH t 1 . This may lead to an assumed exit via stop-loss, 
although in reality the profit-taking limit might have been triggered 
first. However, this conservative assumption is necessary since the 
sequence of H  and L  is unknown for daily price data.  
The resulting strategy has only two parameters for further optimization. R  
sets the risk distance for the stop-loss limit, and P  determines the distance of the 
                                                 
8 The 0.03 constant was used in discussions with investors, to express R  as a multiple of 3% typical volatility, 
and is reported here without changes. 
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profit-taking limit order. The next subsection presents the in-sample optimization and 
simulated results for the final trading rule. 
3.3. Simulation Results 
For the model simulation, we assume to sell short US-$50,000 in stock for every 
Cramer event triggering the entry limit, i.e., profits are not reinvested. We assume 
US-$20 broker commission per transaction and add (substract) 0.1% slippage to 
(from) the price of every buy (sell) transaction to account for potential market impact 
and the bid-ask spread. The optimization procedure tests 35 parameter combinations.9  
Figure III-5: Simulation (in-sample) – cumulative dollar profit as a function of stop-loss factor R 
and profit-taking parameter P, as defined in Eq. (3) and (4) 
Notes: Analysis is based on the development sample, which includes 393 Cramer events from January 
1 to July 31, 2006, assuming US-$50,000 investment per event and 0.1% market impact and US-$20 
broker commission per transaction, without reinvestment of profits. This graph is shown “as-is” from 
the strategy development process. 
 
                                                 
9 R  is set to values  ...,1.6%0.8%,1.0%,  and P  to values  ...,6.0%3.0%,3.5%, . 
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Figure 5 displays the simulated absolute dollar profit for all combinations of 
R  and P . The simulation results show that profitability is robust across all parameter 
settings. After consultation with the investors, we chose 4.5%=P  and 1.2%=R  as 
final parametrization. This is a tighter profit-target and a wider stop-loss than the 
profit maximum at 5.5%=P  and 1.0%=R  would suggest, due to investors’ fears of 
failing to realize profits or closing otherwise profitable positions too early. 
Figure III-6: Simulation (all datasets) – cumulative raw returns in and out of sample with 
parameters R = 1.2% and P = 4.5% 
Notes: Analysis assumes 0.1% market impact and $20 broker commission per transaction for an 
investment of $50,000 per event, without reinvestment of profits. The chart displays simulated trading 
results for all 916 Cramer events, of which a total of 209 pass the entry filter as given in Eq. (2). The 
in-sample dataset includes the Cramer events from Jan 3, 2006 to July 31, 2006, “out-of-sample I” 
those from August 1, 2006 to October 17, 2006, and “out-of-sample II” comprises events from July 28, 
2005 to December 23, 2005. This graph is shown “as-is” from the strategy development process. 
 
Figure 6 shows the final strategy’s simulated account equity curve across all 
sample periods. During the in-sample period, assuming that every Cramer event can 
be traded using the full available capital, the strategy achieves a cumulative return of 
approximately 70.4%.10 It retains its profitability in both out-of-sample periods. The 
Sharpe ratio is 3.05 and 2.00 in the in- and out-of-sample simulation, respectively, and 
                                                 
10 For intraday short-sales, only 30% margin requirements apply, allowing up to three simultaneous positions. 
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2.86 across all ex-ante test data. Table 2 in section 4 provides detailed statistics. These 
results motivated investors to provide capital for the trading experiment. 
4. Results 
We start by reporting the results of the actual-dollar trading test in subsection 4.1. In 
subsection 4.2 we investigate the results to understand the source of profits. 
Figure III-7: Cumulative raw and leveraged returns of 68 actual-dollar trades from December 4, 
2006 to July 27, 2007 
Notes: Chart displays raw and leveraged returns for actual-dollar trades including transaction costs. 
Raw returns assume normalizing trades to a leverage of 1.0. Actual leverage during the trading 
experiment was a weighted average of 1.40. See Appendix for a detailed list of transactions. 
 
4.1. Actual-Dollar Trading Results 
The actual-dollar out-of-sample test started on December 4, 2006. The strategy was 
executed using an Advisor Account at Interactive Brokers, generating a total of 68 
trades11 until July 31, 2007 (see Appendix for a detailed list of transactions).  
                                                 
11 In a joint decision with investors, the first eight trades were executed manually with smaller position sizes to 
 observe potential market reaction to the arbitrage strategy. The 60 remaining trades were executed without 
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Table III-2: Trading strategy performance: trade-by-trade statistics and weekly benchmark 
comparison 
Notes: This table compares actual-dollar trading results during the period from December 4, 2006 to 
July 27, 2007 with the backtest simulation (Panel A) and simple benchmark strategies (Panel B; using 
the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index from Yahoo! Finance as a measure of total stock market 
performance). Panel A statistics are calculated on a per-trade basis, whereas Panel B reports weekly 
returns. Actual-dollar trades are reported including all transaction costs. Benchmark returns do not 
include transaction costs. 
 
Figure 7 displays the realized cumulative raw returns for actual-dollar trades, 
normalizing invested capital to a leverage of 1.0 (blue line), and the weighted returns 
using the actual leverage (dotted orange line)12. The strategy has achieved a 
                                                 
manual intervention. The stop-loss limit was implemented using trailing stop orders offered by the broker (see 
order (2b) in Figure 4). 
12Actual leverage ratios during trading ranged from 0.13 to 4.21 of paid-in capital, depending on liquidity of 
Cramer events and “pattern day-trading” limitations for U.S. stock trading with accounts under US-$25,000. We 
decided to limit position size to about 1.5% of the 20-day average dollar trading volume. Weighted-average 
leverage was 1.4 for all trades. 
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cumulative raw return of 36.3% with a Sharpe ratio of 3.30, and 54.4% leveraged 
return with Sharpe ratio of 3.20. Table 2 provides detailed performance statistics. 
Panel A shows a comparison of strategy performance between the actual-dollar 
trading period and the simulated results generated during ex-ante strategy 
development (see section 3.3). The results show a high significance of actual-dollar 
profitability, with p-values of .001. Performance is also highly persistent across 
periods. On an absolute basis, the average real trade of 0.53% is close to the 
optimized in-sample result of 0.62%. The same is true on a risk-adjusted basis as 
indicated by the Sharpe ratio. These results exclude the additional interest income 
which investors earned in the money market, since their trading capital was never 
used over night. The trade-based statistics show that the distribution of actual trade 
profits is doubly-positively skewed. The strategy incurs more winners (39) than losers 
(29) and the average profit of a winning trade (1.56%) is almost twice that of a losing 
trade (-0.84%). Comparing these statistics with the ex-ante simulation period, we find 
that both components improved. To put this in context, during simulation, the lack of 
intraday data forced us to make conservative assumptions whenever the daily 
11   tt LowHigh  price range indicated that both the profit-target and the stop-loss 
level would have been triggered. Panel B compares the strategy’s actual-dollar trades 
to the performance of simple benchmark strategies (“buy&hold” and “short&hold” 
the overall stock market measured by the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Index). The 
strategy widely outperforms in terms of absolute returns and even more so on a risk-
adjusted basis. Figure 8 shows a graphical comparison of weekly strategy raw returns 
versus the two benchmark strategies. 
Across all performance measures, there is no doubt that the strategy’s real-
money out-of-sample test was successful. 
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4.2. Ex-Post Investigations and Implications for Market Efficiency 
Actual-dollar trading results show that Cramer events represent an economically 
exploitable instance of return predictability in the market. But does this imply a true 
market inefficiency? We start by testing whether Cramer events allow earning excess 
returns after adjusting for known risk factors in the market efficiency literature. So far 
we have only looked at raw returns, adjusting only for the risks from the volatility of 
the strategy itself. 
Figure III-8: Strategy benchmark comparison of weekly returns from December 1, 2006 to July 
27, 2007 
Notes: Chart displays cumulative weekly raw returns for actual-dollar transactions including 
transaction costs, normalizing trades to a leverage of 1.0. Actual leverage on investors’ paid-in capital 
during the trading experiment was 1.40 on average (see Appendix for detailed data on individual 
transactions). Benchmark strategies are defined as holding long or short the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 
Index from December 1, 2006 to July 27, 2007, whereby the short benchmark strategy is assumed to 
earn a 5.25% p.a. risk-free rate on the cash received from the short-sale. 
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To investigate this, we follow Fama & French (1992) and assess if the 
strategy’s returns might be explained by known risk factors13: (1) the “Market” risk 
factor, (2) the “Size” factor capturing the risk of investing in small firms, (3) the 
“Value” factor capturing the risk of investing in firms with low book-to-market ratios, 
(4) the “Momentum” factor (Jeegadeesh & Titman, 1993) capturing the risks of 
investing in firms with large relative past long-term returns, and finally (5) the “Short-
term Reversal” factor capturing the risk of investing in firms with the lowest past 
short-term returns, which has been found to proxy for liquidity risk (see e.g. Pástor & 
Stambaugh, 2003; Amini et al., 2013).  
To reduce the impact of the fact that the strategy does not trade every day, we 
sum up unleveraged trade returns to weekly returns and regress these against 
contemporaneous returns of Market, Size, Value, Momentum and Short-term Reversal 
factors. The specification is: 
 
,**
***=
ttt
tttt
ReversalMomentum
ValueSizeMarketr




 (5) 
whereby tr  is the strategy’s weekly return. As a cross-validation of our results, 
we refer to Bolster & Trahan (2009) who investigate the style effects present in Jim 
Cramer’s picks. The authors find that Cramer events tend to be smaller value stocks 
with positive momentum. Hence, since we are short these stocks, if only for a very 
short time, we should get negative coefficients on the Market, Size, Value, and 
                                                 
13As defined in the Kenneth French Data Library: The “Market” risk factor is the value-weighted return of all 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks minus the risk free rate. The “Size” factor is going long firms below the 
median market capitalization versus short the firms above. The “Value” factor is going long a 50:50 mix of 
value-weighted small and large firm portfolios below the 30th percentile of book-to-market ratios (book equity 
divided by market capitalization), and vice-versa short firms above the 70th percentile. The “Momentum” factor 
is going long a 50:50 mix of value-weighted small and large firm portfolios above the 70th percentile of prior 
returns measured from day -250 to -21, and vice-versa short firms below the 30th percentile. The “Short-term 
Reversal” factor is defined as going long a 50:50 mix of value-weighted small and large firm portfolios up to the 
30th percentile of prior returns measured from day -20 to -1, and vice-versa short firms above the 70th percentile. 
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Momentum factors. In contrast, the strategy’s shorting against price spikes after 
Cramer events should be correlated to the short-side of the Reversal factor portfolio; 
hence, we should find a positive coefficient. Indeed, the regression results in Table 3 
confirm these expectations.  
Table III-3: Regression of strategy returns against common risk factors 
Notes: This table shows regression results and descriptive statistics for weekly strategy returns against 
common risk factors, using the regression specification in Eq. (5). Return data for Market, Size, Value, 
Momentum and Return Reversal risk premia are taken from Kenneth French’s data library 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). Panel A covers the 35 
weeks in the actual-dollar trading period from December 4, 2006 to July 30, 2007. Panel B shows 
results for the whole period from July 28, 2005 to July 30, 2007, combining simulated and actual-
dollar results and using only the 79 weeks in which the trading strategy performed at least one trade. 
Significant coefficients are highlighted in bold. 
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Panel A shows the results for a sample covering only the 35 weeks of live 
trading, which is likely too short to obtain significant parameter estimates. Except for 
the regression intercept (unexplained weekly strategy return), none of the coefficients 
is even barely significant. Therefore we extend our sample to 79 weeks in Panel B to 
include the in-sample simulation period as well, while removing the noise from those 
weeks in which the strategy did not trade. Now the Reversal factor becomes a 
significant predictor of the strategy’s return. However, taking into account the 
descriptive statistics for the variables, it becomes clear that all this explains is small 
variations of weekly strategy returns around their significantly positive mean of 
1.83%. The strategy’s unexplained return (its “Alpha”) is by far the most significant 
predictor of strategy returns! 
Based on the standard risk factor regression, we cannot refute that the strategy 
earned significant excess returns, which points to market inefficiency. On the other 
hand, it is well possible that mapping the returns of an intraday strategy to weekly 
returns and then regressing these returns against contemporaneous factor returns is too 
crude an instrument to explain the components of intraday profits. Unfortunately, to 
our knowledge, the market efficiency literature does not provide a model for intraday 
expected returns.  
How the trading rule navigated the intraday price paths of Cramer events 
should provide clues whether the strategy was merely paid for taking risks, or whether 
it earned excess returns from market timing. The detailed list of transactions (see 
Appendix) reports the holding period for each trade, in minutes. Surprisingly, we do 
not find a relatively uniform distribution of holding periods with a mix of longer and 
shorter trades. To illustrate the data, Figure 9 depicts the cumulative sums of trade 
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count and profit for trades sorted from shortest to longest holding periods. There is a 
clear concentration of trade exits in the first minutes of the trading day. More than half 
of trades are closed within the first 20 minutes, about two-thirds during the first half-
hour. The average holding period is only 34 minutes. No trades except one make it to 
the market close. Rather, there is a substantial bias that either the strategy’s profit-
taking order or the trailing stop-loss order is triggered early in the day. 
Figure III-9: Cumulative trades and actual-dollar profits by holding period 
Notes: Chart displays cumulative share of trade count and trade profits, sorting the 68 actual-dollar 
trades by holding period. 
 
At the same time, these shorter trades are no less profitable than their longer 
counterparts. Moreover, most of the trades exited via trailing stop were exited at small 
losses or even small profits. Due to the logic of the trailing stop, which follows prices 
down at a distance, this implies that many of these trades actually must have been 
profitable trades which reversed upwards to trigger the trailing stop level (see order 
(2b) in Figure 4 to illustrate this). In other words, after the initial down-move to 
correct the initial mispricing from Cramer events, there should be a systematic 
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tendency of stocks to rise again intraday. In short, a “reversal-of-the-reversal” 
pattern. To test for the existence of this pattern, we obtain intraday price data for a 
second sample of 105 Cramer events with market capitalization of up to US-$10 
billion and Cramer price impacts ( CPI ) of at least 1% at market opening, covering 
trading days from November 16, 2006 to May 29, 200714, along with intraday prices 
of the SPDR S&P 500 ETF15. We perform separate regressions of the event returns in 
the first and second half-hours of the trading day, respectively. For the first half-hour, 
we use the following specification: 
 ,**= ,59]:930:[9,,59]:930:[9, titititi MarketOvernightr     (6) 
whereby tir ,  is a Cramer event’s return in the first half-hour of the day, 
tiOvernight ,  is the close-to-open return 1/ ,1,  titi CO  and 59]:930:[9, tiMarket  is the 
contemporaneous market return in the first half-hour using the prices of the SPDR 
S&P 500 ETF as a proxy. For the second half-hour, we shift all terms except 
overnight return forward by half an hour, and add the first half-hour stock return as a 
variable to test for intraday reversal: 
 
 
,*
**=
,30]:1000:[10,
,59]:930:[9,30]:1000:[10,
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Market
Overnightrr





  (7) 
Table 4 shows that there is indeed a significant tendency for price declines of 
the first half-hour to be reversed upwards in the second half-hour. As expected, in the 
first half-hour the initial down-move partially reverses the overnight price-spike. The 
market factor has a significant influence as well with an intraday “beta” of about 2. In 
the second half-hour, however, instead of continuing to correct the mispricing, there is 
a significant tendency to reverse upwards part of the first half-hour down-move. The 
                                                 
14 Provided by Bloomberg. The sample contains 33 of the actual trades. 
15 Symbol: SPY, provided by Lenz & Partner AG. 
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coefficient of -.22 is highly significant at the .0001 level. The size of the initial 
mispricing ( tiOvernight , ) is also a significant predictor, suggesting that the initial 
speculative interest from retail investors (see Engelberg et al., 2012) might also be 
behind this reversal-of-the-reversal phenomenon. 
Table III-4: Regressions of first and second half-hour event returns 
Notes: This table shows regression results and descriptive statistics for regressions of first and second 
half-hour returns on event and market return variables. The intraday data comprises prices by 
Bloomberg for a sample of 105 Cramer Events with overnight returns of at least 1% and market 
capitalization of <=  US-$10 billion, along with contemporaneous market return using the SPDR S&P 
500 ETF as a proxy. The Cramer Events cover a period with trading days from November 16, 2006 to 
May 29, 2007. Panel A regresses stock returns in the 1st half-hour of the trading day against the size of 
the overnight jump and the market return in the 1st half-hour (see Eq. (6)). Panel B regresses stock 
returns in the 2nd half-hour of the trading day against stock returns in the 1st half-hour, the size of the 
overnight jump and the market return in the 2nd half-hour (see Eq. (7)). 
 
Did the strategy manage to earn excess returns from this intraday pattern? We 
propose a simple benchmark of what the fair compensation for a liquidity-providing 
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arbitrageur should be. Studies on stock recommendations16 and Cramer events17 show 
that most if not all abnormal post-recommendation returns subside after a few days, 
weeks or months. Since our strategy holds the stocks only during the first day ( 1t ), 
a prudent assumption on the expected return for the average arbitrageur on the trading 
day would be the expected down-move from 1tOpen  to 1tClose .18 Using this simple 
benchmark, the expected profit amounts to about 33.5% earned with a holding period 
of six and a half hours for the 68 observed trades. The strategy however, earned 
36.3% with an average holding period of only 34 minutes. Therefore, not only did the 
strategy manage to capture a slightly higher-than-expected profit, it also put its capital 
at risk for less than one-tenth of the time. This suggests that next to a fair 
compensation for liquidity provision, the strategy also earned excess returns from 
timing the market better intraday than the average market participant. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper conducts an actual-dollar trading experiment as a data-snooping bias-free 
and realistic out-of-sample test of an ex-ante-specified trading rule. We exploit the 
correction of mispricings caused by retail investors buying stocks after 
recommendations by Jim Cramer in the daily evening TV show “Mad Money” on 
CNBC. Investigating the source of these profits suggests that common risk factors 
cannot refute that the strategy earns excess returns, although some exposure to short-
term Reversal indicates that it earns a premium for liquidity provision. Looking 
                                                 
16see e.g. Kerl & Walter (2007), Busse & Green (2002), Liang (1999), Metcalf & Malkiel (1994), Wright (1994), 
and Barber  & Loeffler (1993) 
17see e.g. Engelberg et al. (2012), Bolster et al. (2012), Hobbs et al. (2012), Chen et  al. (2011), Keasler & McNeil 
(2010), Lim & Rosario (2010), Bolster & Trahan (2009), Karniouchina et al. (2009), and Neumann & Kenny 
(2007) 
18This definition is conceptually comparable with the statistical arbitrageurs in Seasholes & Wu (2007), who 
accumulate shares on day t0 to sell on day t+1. For Cramer events, t0 is before the recommendation, hence the 
Open on t+1 is the earliest possible entry point. 
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intraday confirms that the strategy also benefited from market timing, by navigating a 
“reversal-of-the-reversal” pattern early in the day better than a benchmark average 
arbitrageur. 
These findings contribute to several literatures in financial economics. First, in 
the market efficiency literature, this study appears to be the first to use the stock 
market as a laboratory to test the validity of a trading rule. This provides a realistic 
out-of-sample test without data-snooping bias. Furthermore, the high share of 
unexplained profits calls for further research on intraday expected returns. Second, in 
the literature on recommendation effects, this study confirms that the abnormal returns 
found in prior studies on Cramer events are actually exploitable. The intraday 
“reversal-of-the-reversal” adds to previous results showing only a monotonous decline 
of the mispricing. In fact, we find that the mispricing re-widens intraday. This implies 
the need for arbitrageurs to time the market to maximize profits from the mispricing. 
To the third and final body of literature on limits to arbitrage, these findings provide 
confirmatory evidence for theoretical models. The intraday re-widening of 
mispricings supports Abreu & Brunnermeier (2002) who suggest that arbitrageurs 
might fail to correct a mispricing because they fail to synchronize their trades. In their 
model, no individual arbitrageur has enough risk capacity to counter the demand 
shock following a stock recommendation, and therefore an arbitrageur has to rely on 
the actions of other investors moving prices in the desired direction. This coordination 
problem leads to strategic uncertainty as to whether the arbitrage will be successful or 
not, causing arbitrageurs to delay their transactions as they attempt to time the market. 
Moreover, knowing about the transitory intraday up-trend makes it rational to 
speculate in the direction of the mispricing (i.e. contrary to fundamentals), thus 
increasing the mispricing further. This supports the hypothesis of “destabilizing 
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speculation” by De Long et al. (1990). Taken together, part of the high returns of the 
trading experiment might well be explained by suboptimal strategic behavior of less 
sophisticated arbitrageurs. 
Finally, do the excess returns also constitute a significant market inefficiency? 
In a conference presentation on the neoclassical response to market anomalies, 
Stephen Ross proposes the following test for a new anomaly (Ross, 2006): 
(1) Is it true? (i.e. are returns statistically significant and not explained by 
other factors?) 
(2) How damaging is it to the neoclassical theory of finance? (i.e. is it 
economically large and refuting existing models of asset prices?) 
According to Ross, we should only be concerned by phenomena that score 
high in both dimensions. On the first dimension, this paper shows statistically 
significant excess returns that cannot be explained by risk factors. On the second 
dimension, however, the excess returns and intraday patterns found after Cramer 
events do not constitute an economically large deviation from efficient prices – at 
least not on a stand-alone basis. To illustrate, consider that the median daily liquidity 
of traded stocks is only about US-$25 to 50 million per day(see Table I). Even if we 
could trade five percent of a stock’s liquidity without market impact destroying 
profitability, the strategy would still only scale to an invested capital of US-$2.5 
million per trade. If we were content with 5% annual returns, maybe we could deliver 
these returns for US-$10 to 20 million of capital. Still, this is orders of magnitudes 
smaller than the break-even sizes of well-known anomalies such as Value or 
Momentum, which reach hundreds of billions (Frazzini et al., 2012; Asness et al., 
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2014). For a large institutional investor, Cramer events would be a tiny profit 
opportunity. 
Further investigations of recommendations and other attention-based events 
such as large price changes are necessary to confirm and generalize our results. For 
the example of Cramer events, we learn that the “business” of correcting mispricings 
is profitable, risky and competitive. 
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Appendix: Detailed Account of Actual-Dollar Trades 
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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of high frequency trading (HFT) on intraday extreme 
events in U.S. stock returns. Although previous studies have generally found that, in 
aggregate, HFT improves broad market quality measures, it has remained an open 
question of whether this is also the case during turbulent markets, or whether HFT 
actually contributes to turbulence. Indeed, researchers and market operators suggest 
numerous ways in which HFT might exacerbate extreme events, and empirical 
investigations have found situational evidence that HFT intensified selling pressure 
during the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010. Using intraday price and HFT activity data, 
we examine the impact of HFT on extreme intraday price moves in general. To 
identify causal effects, we use the introduction of Regulation NMS (summer 2007) 
and the SEC Naked Access Ban (winter 2011/2012) as instrumental variables in two 
natural experiments. Our results strongly suggest that HFT activity exacerbates 
intraday extreme events. 
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 “In the present environment, where high frequency and algorithmic trading 
predominate […], liquidity problems are an inherent difficulty that must be 
addressed. Indeed, even in the absence of extraordinary market events, limit order 
books can quickly empty and prices can crash simply due to the speed and 
numbers of orders flowing into the market and due to the ability to instantly 
cancel orders.” 
- Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, 2011. 
Recommendations Regarding Regulatory Responses to the 
 Market Events of May 6, 2010. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, high frequency trading (hereafter HFT1), a high-speed, low-
latency subset of algorithmic trading, has come to dominate many securities markets, 
particularly equities. Recent estimates by TABB Group and Morgan Stanley suggest 
that between 50% and 80% of U.S. stock transactions now involve HFT2. Meanwhile, 
concern has grown among researchers, policy makers and market operators over the 
impact of HFT on market behavior.  
Dramatic advances in information technology have made HFT feasible, while 
structural and regulatory changes have motivated its growth. Along the entire value 
chain of securities trading, computers and software have largely replaced formerly 
phone- and human-based processes. Automation has shifted the balance between 
humans and algorithms in the competition for the shortest-term profit opportunities 
from market-making and arbitrage. Before the advent of HFT, when the U.S. trading 
landscape consisted only of the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges and 
the futures markets, this role fell to the smartest and fastest human traders, most of 
whom were specialists and dedicated market-makers. In the new millennium, 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, HFT refers to the activity of high frequency trading 
2 See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/business/with-profits-dropping-high-speed-trading-cools-down.html 
and http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da5d033c-8e1c-11e1-bf8f-00144feab49a.html, last accessed 01/29/2014. 
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regulatory changes such as Regulation NMS (“National Market System”, see SEC, 
2005) have allowed the number of alternative trading venues to multiply, and 
encouraged private investment in technology to interlink and integrate the national 
market system. In the resulting fragmented automated trading environment, high 
frequency trading algorithms have largely taken over the role of market-makers and 
arbitrageurs ensuring short-run market efficiency. 
The competitive environment today is best characterized as an arms race of 
increasing algorithmic trading speed (Gai et al., 2013) and intelligence (Credit Suisse, 
2012). The race for the lowest latency – the time to obtain and process new 
information and trade on it – is in the order of microseconds for HFT infrastructure 
already co-located at the exchanges to minimize delay from the speed of light3 
(Johnson et al., 2013). Facing a physical boundary to speed, the remaining source of 
competitive advantage is developing ever-smarter algorithms. Given the costs of 
establishing and maintaining an HFT operation, it is natural for these institutions to 
seek every legal advantage to generate profits. For instance, by acting as an automated 
market maker serving liquidity demand faster than the competition (Hagströmer & 
Nordén, 2013), being the fastest to analyze and trade on news (Scholtus et al., 2014), 
or by anticipating and trading ahead of large orders from slower-reacting investors 
(SEC, 2010). 
How have these developments affected relevant stock market characteristics? 
Does HFT pass on cost-savings from its automated intermediation, or does it impose 
externalities on other market participants? Among both academics and practitioners, 
                                                 
3 For instance, NASDAQ advertises its new “1G Ultra” co-location connectivity to be nine microseconds faster 
than existing offers (http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=colo, last accessed 01/29/2014). 
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there is no clear consensus. Findings vary widely depending on the observer and the 
characteristics measured. A small but fast-growing body of empirical papers 
investigates the impact of HFT on measures of market quality. Hendershott et al. 
(2011) and Boehmer et al. (2013) study U.S. and international stock markets and find 
that algorithmic trading and HFT activity improve liquidity, enhance price discovery 
via quotes, and improve market efficiency. The latter also find that HFT increases 
volatility relative to what could be expected from narrower bid-ask spreads (Jones, 
2013), especially on high-volatility days. Hagströmer & Nordén (2013) drill down 
further by separating HFT into market-making and opportunistic strategies, showing 
that high frequency market-making mitigates intraday volatility. While all of the 
above find an aggregate positive effect of HFT on most measures of market quality in 
normal market conditions, they raise the question whether HFT is equally beneficial 
in turbulent markets (Hendershott et al., 2011). Since, unlike the specialists that they 
have largely replaced, high frequency traders are not actually required to provide 
liquidity, they may exacerbate problems during turbulent markets by withdrawing 
from trading, or even by switching from being net providers to net demanders of 
liquidity. 
The “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010 put this question in the spotlight, when a 
large institutional sell order induced high frequency traders to exit the market (Easley 
et al., 2011). Cascading selling led to a dramatic market-wide crash of over 5%, with 
some stocks trading down to mere pennies, followed by a rebound (Kirilenko et al., 
2014). Again, the interpretations vary. Jones (2013) argues extreme events exemplify 
a generic feature of markets with intermediaries temporarily overwhelmed by 
liquidity demand. In contrast, other authors hold that HFT could exacerbate volatility 
through new mechanisms such as predatory trading (i.e. trading that induces and/or 
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exploits the trading needs of other investors, see e.g., Jarrow & Protter, 2012) or 
positive-feedback loops from correlated HFT behaviors and strategies (e.g., Zigrand et 
al., 2011).  
Does HFT systematically exacerbate intraday extreme events? This paper 
extends the literature with empirical evidence on the impact of HFT, focusing 
particularly on the most turbulent periods. Building on Zawadowski et al. (2006), the 
proposed measure of intraday extreme events extracts the largest up or down price 
changes from intraday data, and determines their extremeness by comparing the move 
size with stocks’ typical volatility in the same time of the day. Effectively, it is a 
measure of tail risk in the form of “X-sigma events”4. The dataset combines intraday 
price and HFT activity data, and confirms the massive growth in HFT over the past 
decade. A key challenge to determining a causal effect of HFT activity is that it is a 
potentially endogenous choice by traders. For instance, their actions might depend on 
the exact market characteristic we study, in that it might be particularly attractive for 
HFT to trade temporarily volatile stocks, rather than causing this volatility. To address 
this challenge, we follow the methodology established by Hendershott et al. (2011) 
and use exogenous shocks to the level of HFT activity in an instrumental variable 
regression to identify causality. Previous studies have found Regulation NMS  and the 
SEC Naked Access Ban (hereafter NAB) as significant drivers of growth and decline 
in HFT activity (Chung & Chuwonganant, 2012), which we confirm in this paper. 
The results of our instrumental variable regression strongly suggest that HFT 
indeed causes more extreme intraday price moves. Results are robust to common 
                                                 
4 For example, if a stock’s expected 1-hour intraday standard deviation (sigma) at 11 am is 1%, and it registers a 
10% price move in that period, this would be a 10-sigma event. 
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control variables, specification changes, and across different periods. These findings 
contribute evidence to the debate on the benefits and costs of HFT. To investors and 
issuers, excess volatility and tail risk are costs. They increase the riskiness of holding 
a position. Transitory price moves impede risk management via Stop-Loss orders by 
increasing adverse selection (i.e., stocks are sold at temporarily depressed prices). 
Hedging costs and needs increase with volatility and tail risk. Liquidity and volatility 
are important factors in asset pricing; therefore, issuers may face lower share prices 
and difficult conditions for equity issuance (Boehmer et al., 2013) . In sum, more 
severe intraday extreme events imply that investors pay for HFT activity by incurring 
externalities from increased market fragility. This adds to our understanding of the 
impact of HFT on market quality.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates in further detail the 
focus of this study on HFT’s effect on intraday extreme events, by establishing an 
understanding of known HFT strategies and potential mechanisms by which HFT 
might dampen or amplify intraday price moves. Section 3 presents the data and 
variable definitions for this study. We describe the exogenous shocks and their effect 
on HFT in section 4. Section 5 discusses the instrumental variable regression results. 
Finally, section 6 concludes this study and derives implications for future research. 
2. High Frequency Trading, Intraday Extreme Events, and 
Previous Work 
This section explores the potential link between what HFT does and how it might 
mitigate or exacerbate extreme events in intraday stock returns, within the context of 
previous work in this area. We start by describing HFT behaviors on a stand-alone 
basis (section 2.1), before moving on to consider possible mechanisms of trader 
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interaction – involving both HFT and non-HFT – in section 2.2. We thereby focus our 
attention on behaviors and mechanisms with a conceivable influence on extreme 
events.  
2.1. HFT Behaviors and Strategies 
While there is not yet a universally accepted definition of HFT, the SEC (2010) 
defines it as trading activity which is characterized by (1) using extraordinarily high-
speed hard- and software to generate, route and execute orders, (2) using co-location 
and direct data feeds offered by exchanges to minimize latency, (3) establishing and 
liquidating positions in extremely short time-frames, (4) submitting numerous orders 
and cancelling them shorty after submission (i.e. high order-to-trade ratio), and (5) 
ending the trading day with a position as close to zero as possible. 
Liquidity provision through market-making-like strategies is one of the 
primary activities of high frequency traders. With their superior capability to instantly 
reflect new information in their quotes and much lower cost of intermediation, they 
have largely taken over the role of supplying liquidity from human traders (e.g., 
Hendershott et al., 2011). Liquidity is an important determinant of non-fundamental 
volatility (SEC, 2005). A liquid market allows investors to execute large orders close 
to the current price without causing large price moves away from fundamental value. 
A liquid market is robust, meaning that transitory demand or supply shocks have little 
impact on prices. In contrast, an illiquid market is fragile, meaning that large orders 
have more price impact and thus increase non-fundamental volatility. Hence, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in the supply of liquidity dampens market volatility and decreases 
the likelihood of extreme events. Hagströmer & Nordén (2013) differentiate between 
market-making and opportunistic strategies in their empirical study of HFT on the 
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NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm market, and provide evidence that the majority of HFT is 
market-making in nature and indeed reduces volatility. 
Algorithmic execution and order anticipation is another major activity of high 
frequency trading. Several studies document features of HFT behavior which 
counteract liquidity improvements and increase the price impact of orders. Kim & 
Murphy (2013) show that effective bid-ask spreads have not actually improved as 
much as traditional market quality measures would suggest, once decreasing trade 
sizes – due to the increasing need to slice large orders into small tranches – are taken 
into account. This has made algorithmic execution of large orders the norm. Rather 
than risking significant market impact by placing one large order, investors often rely 
on proprietary or agency execution algorithms to buy or sell piece-by-piece over time. 
This innovation in trading creates opportunities in its own right. According to 
Quantitative Services Group (2010), this increased parceling leaves a “footprint” 
which sophisticated pattern-recognition algorithms can detect. This enables order 
anticipation strategies where HFT picks up an algorithmic execution early in the 
process, quickly builds a position in the same direction, and then immediately closes 
it, either by transacting with the original institutional order, or shortly thereafter. This 
is similar to the well-known strategy of front-running orders and has two effects: first, 
HFT competes with institutional orders for liquidity, effectively increasing the price 
impact of institutional trades. Second, as order anticipators close out their positions, a 
portion of this price impact is reversed. Indeed, based on a large sample of actual 
algorithmic executions, Quantitative Services Group (2010) find a significant reversal 
pattern within five minutes after the original order’s completion. In essence, this is 
non-fundamental volatility. Tong (2013) confirms that HFT leads to an increase in 
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institutional trading costs and highlights the opportunistic nature of HFT liquidity 
provision. 
Latency and structural arbitrage. HFT also exploits structural weaknesses in 
the market structure. McInish & Upson (2012) document that high frequency traders 
use their latency advantage from their direct exchange price feed to pick off slow 
liquidity demanders who observe only the much slower national price feed. Then, 
when regular traders submit an order, the quotes they intended to trade on have 
already vanished, resulting in inferior executions. In addition, extreme HFT message 
volume can exploit weaknesses in market structure. Egginton et al. (2013) find 
systematic instances of “quote-stuffing”, i.e. very high rates of orders that are 
immediately cancelled, which could slow down exchange systems, create additional 
latency arbitrage opportunities and confuse other traders. Both strategies increase non-
fundamental volatility. 
2.2. Interaction Mechanisms involving HFT 
So far, we have identified several opportunistic HFT strategies, which profit-
maximizing HFT operators appear to employ, and which tend to increase volatility. 
Beyond that, trader interaction yields several potential mechanisms.  
Predatory trading. Theoretical models suggest HFT could create a mispricing 
and induce other players to trade in the same direction, causing crashes and price 
spikes (e.g., Boehmer et al., 2013; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2005; Jarrow & Protter, 
2012). Thereby, HFT can profit by trading ahead of the price moves it creates. That 
some high frequency operators in fact follow such strategies is documented 
unequivocally in a report by the algorithmic execution team of Credit Suisse (2012). 
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They expose instances “momentum-ignition”5, “layering”6, and other predatory 
practices. Credit Suisse’s emphasis on equipping its own agency execution algorithms 
with targeted defenses against these practices underlines their economic relevance. 
Most importantly, “momentum-ignition” and “layering” influence non-HFT players’ 
trades and can therefore affect prices on much larger timescales. 
Positive-feedback processes from correlated strategies. The greatest risks, 
arise when positive-feedback loops take hold among a larger share of market 
participants. The “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010 serves as the prominent example for 
market-wide self-feeding volatility in several empirical studies showing that HFT 
exacerbated the crash by turning their liquidity provision into liquidity demand. 
Absent affirmative obligations to provide liquidity at all times, HFT liquidity supply 
is opportunistic and may exit the market when it is most needed. Jones (2013) argues 
that positive-feedback processes have occurred long before the advent of HFT and are 
rather a generic feature of equity markets than an HFT-specific risk. He points out 
several historical market-wide crashes as examples. In the “Black Monday” crash of 
October 19, 1987, for instance, many market participants used similar portfolio 
insurance algorithms, whose correlated hedging orders overwhelmed market-makers 
and exchange systems. In general, whenever sudden liquidity shocks from correlated 
orders overwhelm the supply-side, regardless of the time frame, self-feeding price 
moves can arise. Hence, risks from HFT are essentially not new. However, Jones’ 
generalization ignores one important structural difference caused by the sub-second 
time scale of HFT: trading speed is hitting the limits of physics. In a few 
                                                 
5 “Momentum-ignition” attempts to trigger other market participants to trade quickly and induce a price-move, e.g. 
by moving prices beyond recent high or low prices.  
6 By entering large orders at several price points, “Layering” creates a false impression of demand or supply in the 
order book to motivate others to trade. 
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microseconds, computers can perform only a few computations. This limits the scope 
and kinds of information that an HFT algorithm can process, and it restricts the 
complexity and diversity of profit-maximizing reactions to that information. Hence, 
Johnson et al. (2013) hold that high frequency traders are therefore bound to come up 
with similar strategies. At sub-second speeds, human traders cannot intervene7, 
leaving the sub-second space completely to HFT. For the first time, in contrast to all 
previous market episodes, it is now possible for securities markets to enter short-run 
“all-machine phases” unencumbered by human traders. The authors identify this as 
one reason for “mini-flash crashes” observed in stocks in second and sub-second time 
frames. Along this line of reasoning, Sowers et al. (2012) propose a model in which 
correlated HFT strategies – and volatility – arise only from their herding on the 
smallest time scales compared to everyone else. The assertion that HFT entails 
correlated strategies is confirmed empirically by Breckenfelder (2013) and Chaboud 
et al. (2013).  
In sum, there are plausible mechanisms and empirical evidence that HFT 
could cause volatility and extreme events. Above all, correlated HFT strategies and 
their interactions with slower traders could cause positive-feedback processes that are 
not limited to the sub-second HFT realm, but lead to excess price moves in longer 
period. In subsequent sections, we explore whether this is a general phenomenon. 
                                                 
7 Minimal human reaction times for the simple task of registering and reacting to a visual signal average about 250 
milliseconds, see http://www.humanbenchmark.com/tests/reactiontime/index.php, which excludes additional 
time for more demanding tasks such as making a trading decision. 
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3. Data, Variables, and Descriptive Analysis 
The analyses in this paper use daily panel data with observations on 1,465 liquid U.S. 
stocks from January 3, 2006 to August 28, 2013. The daily panel aggregates intraday 
price and HFT activity data (see section 3.1) to our main regression variables for HFT 
activity (see section 3.2) and intraday extreme events (see section 3.3). Finally, 
section 3.4 provides an initial descriptive analysis of the data. 
3.1. Raw data 
The raw intraday data combine 1-minute price8 and HFT activity9 datasets. For every 
stock-minute, the data contain open, high, low and close prices and volume, as well as 
a measure for HFT activity (hereafter HFT flags). Our HFT flag variable is defined as 
the number of seconds of each minute (i.e., a number between 0 and 60) in which a 
stock has more than 100 quote changes per trade per second on any of the U.S. 
exchanges in the consolidated TAQ (trades-and-quotes) feed.10 This is similar to the 
high order-to-trade ratio flag regularly used in HFT definitions by scholars (e.g., 
Egginton et al., 2013) and regulators (see section 2.1). While we cannot directly 
observe HFT activity, it is highly unlikely for a quote-to-trade ratio above 100 to 
occur with only human traders entering orders.11 The measure is even somewhat 
conservative, since it ignores instances of moderate algorithmic quoting activity. 
                                                 
8  Intraday price data is from financial market data service Lenz & Partner (VWD Group), providing 1-minute 
 prices for the period January 3, 2005 to August 28, 2013. 
9  HFT activity data is provided by NANEX, a data feed service provider and research firm, covering the period 
 January 3, 2006 to August 28, 2013 
10Quote changes comprise any order changes at the top of the order book, i.e. any changes in the best bid-ask 
prices or sizes. The exclusion of order change messages deeper in the book is unlikely to affect our results 
compared to studies such as Hendershott et al. (2011) and Scholtus et al. (2014) using the full message volume. 
Boehmer et al. (2013) has found the time series of both variants highly similar. 
11Humans, with effective reaction times rarely below one second (Johnson et al., 2013), can hardly achieve this. 
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From the intraday dataset containing all stocks listed on U.S. exchanges at the end of 
the sample period, we use a sample of the most liquid U.S. stocks, whose annual 
average price and daily dollar-volume exceed $10 and $20 million, respectively, for at 
least one year during the sample period12. We exclude half-days around U.S. 
exchange holidays and focus on regular trading hours from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm. 
Requiring at least two years of data, removing ETFs, closed-end funds, and correlated 
dual share-classes, and excluding six stocks with longer trading halts yields the final 
sample of 1,465 relatively liquid U.S. stocks13. We complement this with firm-level 
variables14, including the free float and total number of shares outstanding.  
3.2. Proxy Variables for HFT Activity 
Aggregating the intraday price and HFT data yields two HFT proxies: the raw daily 
count of HFT flags for stock i in period t, which we denote 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧, and a 
trading-volume-adjusted version, which we denote 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧, defined as: 
 
𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧ =
𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧ ∗ 1,000,000
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒௜௧
 
(1) 
The reason for this adjustment is that the simple activity count may overstate 
HFT activity15, since higher overall trading volume makes random occurrences of 100 
quotes-per-trade per stock-second slightly more likely.16 We can interpret this 
                                                 
12This introduces survivorship bias, which could overstate time series increases in stocks’ liquidity, price, and size 
 measures, while potentially biasing volatility downwards. However, firm and time fixed effects in a panel 
 regression framework pick up these slow moving compositional changes. 
13From the sample of 5128 stocks, filtering out ETFs, closed-end funds, trusts, acquisition companies and other 
 special-purpose vehicles removes 462 securities, the minimum price/liquidity criteria remove 3099 stocks, and 
 the sample length and quality checks (including dual share-classes) remove another 102. 
14Provided by FINVIZ 
15We follow Hendershott et al. (2011) in adjusting raw activity data by share volume to make sure we are not 
 merely picking up contemporaneous changes in market liquidity. 
16We also performed the analysis adjusting HFT_flagsit by dollar volume; however, it is highly correlated to 
 HFT_volume_rateit and does not yield any additional insights. 
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volume-adjusted rate as a conservative measure of “HFT market share” in total 
market activity.  
3.3. Detecting and Measuring Intraday Extreme Events (IEE) 
An intraday extreme event (hereafter IEE) measure requires two components: First, a 
measure of expected intraday volatility to assess which intraday price moves are 
“extreme”, and second, a way of measuring the largest up or down price move that 
occurred in a given intraday period. 
For the intraday volatility benchmark, we follow (Zawadowski et al., 2006) to 
take into account the intraday profile of volatility. It is highest at market open, when 
market participants price in accumulated news from the overnight non-trading period, 
lower during the middle of the day, and rises somewhat toward the market close along 
with trading volume (e.g., Kalev et al., 2004). Hence, we start by estimating the 
daytime volatility for stock i on day t in minute m (1 to M = 390 for each minute in 
regular trading hours from 9:30 am to 3:59 pm) for a day-start-bounded lookback 
window of k minutes, which we set to a standard 60 minutes throughout this study: 
 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎_𝑑𝑠𝑏௜௧௠ = ඩ ෍
𝑟௜௧୫ᇲ
ଶ
1 + 𝑚 − max (1, 𝑚 − 𝑘)
௠
୫ᇲୀ୫ୟ୶ (ଵ,୫ି୩)
 (2) 
where 𝑟௜௧୫ᇲ is defined as the close-to-close log. return for all minutes except 
the first of each trading day, which we replace by its intra-minute return 
log(𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒௠/𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛௠) to exclude overnight returns. Thus 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎_𝑑𝑠𝑏௜௧௠ provides an 
estimate of one-minute realized volatility for a rolling k-minute lookback window, 
which is capped by the day start boundary (if 𝑚 < 𝑘) to exclude overnight and 
previous day returns. To obtain the longer-term volatility benchmark, as in 
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(Zawadowski et al., 2006), we calculate a d = 60 day moving average of 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎_𝑑𝑠𝑏௜௧௠ 
for each minute m of the day: 
 
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎_𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘௜௧௠ = ෍
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎_𝑑𝑠𝑏௜௧ᇲ௠
𝑑
௧ିଵ
௧ᇲୀ௧ିௗ
∗                  
                                                                ඥ1 + 𝑚 − max (1, 𝑚 − 𝑘) 
(3)  
and apply the scaling rule17 for volatility to estimate expected volatility for 
each k-minute rolling lookback window during the trading day. 
To measure the largest directional price movements in the corresponding lookback 
window, we define 𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒_𝑑𝑛௜௧௠ for stock i on day t, during minute m of the 
trading day, as log(𝑃௠௔௫ 𝑃௠⁄ ) in the lookback window, from the highest high (𝑃௠௔௫) 
to the low price (𝑃௠) in current minute m. To illustrate, consider the calculation at 
10:00 am. Due to the day start boundary, the lookback window for detecting the peak 
price shrinks to the 30 minutes from 9:30 to 9:59 am. Assuming the price peak within 
this period occurred at 9:41, 𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒_𝑑𝑛௜௧௠ captures the move from the high of 
minute “9:41” to the low in minute “10:00 am”. 𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒_𝑢𝑝௜௧௠ is defined vice-
versa. 
Combining these two components, we define our intraday extreme event 
measure as: 
 𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑑𝑛௜௧௠ =
|𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒_𝑑𝑛௜௧௠|
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎_𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘௜௧௠
 (4) 
                                                 
17It is important to note that intraday returns violate the scaling rule’s iid distribution assumption, particularly due 
to minimum tick-sizes of 1 cent. However, our focus on liquid higher-price stocks mitigates this, and most 
importantly, the fixed effects in panel regressions pick up any persistent stock-specific bias. Therefore, for a 
given stock, as long as its price level and trade frequency do not change substantially, this volatility benchmark 
remains sufficiently consistent over time. 
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and define 𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑢𝑝௜௧௠ analogously for upside moves. In essence, we obtain a 
normalized measure of extremeness, which we can interpret as an “X-sigma move”. 
Finally, to construct a daily time series variable for use in daily panel regressions, we 
aggregate the two 1-minute time series 𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑢𝑝௜௧௠ and 𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑑𝑛௜௧௠ to a single daily 
time series 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ by aggregating their daily extremes18: 
 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ = maxଵஸ௠ஸெ(𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑑𝑛௜௧௠) + maxଵஸ௠ஸெ(𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑢𝑝௜௧௠) (5) 
𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ is our dependent variable in regressions to measure the effect of HFT on 
intraday extreme events. It captures the two points per day – one for upside, one for 
downside moves – when an asset exhibits the largest directional moves compared to 
its typical volatility in the same period. Partial up/down variants, using only one of the 
two intraday time series, could be used to analyze upside and downside extremes 
separately. Still, the combination has valuable characteristics: First, it reduces bias 
from market-wide intraday up and down trends. Second, if a stock gyrates wildly in 
both directions during the day, it leads to even higher values. This is valuable for our 
aim to measure unusual intraday volatility that is unlikely to be driven solely by 
fundamentals, but at least in part arising from trading dynamics itself (e.g., Farmer & 
Joshi, 2002). 
3.4. Descriptive Analysis 
Summary statistics for these variables can be seen in Table IV-1, which summarizes 
the panel with two groups of variables. Panel A reports statistics on the main 
regression variables: the HFT proxies HFT_flags and HFT_volume_rate and the 
intraday extreme event variable IEE from Equation (5). Panel B reports summary 
                                                 
18We exclude values of 𝐼𝐸𝐸_𝑢𝑝/𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛௜௧௠ near the daily open and close (the first 10 and the last 15 minutes of the 
trading day) to remove observations with too short lookback due to the day start bound, and to prevent news-
driven moves from dominating the sample. 
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statistics on the explanatory variables we use to capture changes in market conditions. 
Following Boehmer et al. (2013) and Hendershott et al. (2011) we use: Volatility, 
defined as log(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑤⁄ ), 1/Price, Size (total market 
capitalization), and Turnover, defined as the daily share volume in percent of a 
company’s free float. All variables are 99.9% winsorized, i.e. values beyond the 
0.05/99.95% quantiles are set to the quantile values. 
Table IV-1: Full Sample Summary statistics 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of annual means per stock for the full combined price and 
HFT activity sample from January 3, 2006 to August 28, 2013. 
 
The HFT proxies in Panel A reveal a massive increase over time with 
substantial variation across stocks, both within and between market capitalization 
categories. Means are considerably larger than medians, suggesting a skewed 
distribution with concentrations of HFT activity in a small group of stocks. From 
2008 onwards, once HFT has spread to almost all stocks, the 5% and 95% quantiles 
differ by a factor of roughly 100 for HFT_flags, and a factor of 20 for 
HFT_volume_rate, indicating the wide range of HFT activity levels across stocks. In 
Panel A: Main Regressors 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013*
HFT_flags Mean 1.4 37.2 72.4 100.5 161.0 357.3 198.9 158.6
(# flags / day) 5% 0.0 0.4 2.1 5.4 6.3 9.2 10.8 6.8
Median 0.0 20.2 30.0 34.0 53.5 117.3 79.0 73.2
95% 5.8 125.2 285.4 448.5 698.7 1,541.1 766.1 593.7
HFT_volume_rate Mean 0.4 31.9 36.2 61.2 90.6 148.9 118.4 109.5
(# flags / 1 million 5% 0.0 1.0 3.4 9.2 13.6 19.6 19.2 12.6
 shares traded) Median 0.0 20.9 18.6 31.9 59.2 101.6 82.1 76.1
95% 1.9 98.8 114.1 181.7 279.5 398.2 315.4 274.3
IEE Mean 4.72 5.16 5.30 4.04 4.48 4.82 4.41 4.48
(x times intraday 5% 3.99 4.51 4.75 3.61 3.87 4.18 3.84 3.89
 volatility benchmark) Median 4.69 5.10 5.26 4.02 4.49 4.85 4.42 4.50
95% 5.54 6.03 5.94 4.51 5.02 5.33 4.87 4.98
Panel B: Control Variables for Market Conditions
Volatility (daily range) Mean 2.55 2.86 5.49 4.53 2.88 3.11 2.58 2.32
(percent) Median 2.36 2.69 5.28 4.13 2.68 2.90 2.29 2.02
Price Mean 36.96 42.60 35.31 26.70 34.05 38.81 40.49 46.97
($) Median 31.25 35.69 28.50 21.59 28.20 31.38 32.52 38.38
Size (market cap.) Mean 15.47 17.85 14.88 11.07 13.22 13.89 14.27 16.12
($ billions) Median 4.43 4.81 3.79 2.90 3.66 4.22 4.15 4.97
Share turnover Mean 0.96 1.17 1.46 1.38 1.15 1.26 1.14 1.09
(percent of float) Median 0.68 0.76 1.12 1.03 0.86 0.95 0.85 0.81
N (# stocks in sample) 1,223 1,293 1,334 1,378 1,423 1,465 1,465 1,465
* data until August 28
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contrast, there is much less cross-sectional variation in IEE, indicating the efficacy of 
normalizing by the stock’s individual intraday volatility profile. Thus, the top and 
bottom quantiles differ only by a factor of 1.3 on average. Changes in market 
conditions, particularly in the financial crisis of 2008/2009, can also be seen in the 
control variables in Panel B: Price and Size drop considerably into 2009 before 
recovering substantially; Turnover and Volatility show an inverse pattern. 
Figure IV-1: HFT Activity as Share of Total Stock-Minutes 
Notes: This graph depicts the daily percentage of stock-minutes with at least one HFT quote activity 
flag and its 1-year (252 day) centered moving average. The derivation for each trading day t is 
% 𝐻𝐹𝑇 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠௧ =
෍ ∑ 𝟏ுி்_௙௟௔௚௦೔೟೘வ଴
ெ
௠ୀଵ
ூ೟
௜ୀଵ
𝐼௧𝑀௧
 
whereby i denotes individual stocks, 𝐼௧ is the daily number of stocks in the dataset, m refers to the 
current minute in trading day (1 to M=390, i.e. each minute from 9:30 am to 3:59 pm EST). 
 
 
The rising market penetration of HFT can be clearly observed in Figure 1, 
which effectively plots HFT market share, calculated as the daily percentage of HFT-
affected stock-minutes. Growth starts in 2007 and persists until 2011, reaching daily 
peaks above 50% in 2011, when it affected more than half of the available “stock-
time”. Beginning in 2012, HFT activity drops notably and stabilizes at levels of about 
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one-third below peak. In addition to these longer-term trends, HFT activity exhibits 
regular seasonal variations, including an annual drop of activity toward the end of the 
year. 
Both the timing of entry and the eventual overall level of HFT activity varied 
considerably with market capitalization, as can be seen in Figure 2. HFT participants 
first targeted the large cap stocks, which is not surprising as these also tend to be the 
most liquid. As profit maximizing traders, they likely focused their initial algorithmic 
trading technology investments and trading capital on the stocks providing the most 
trading opportunities. Even after much of the entry period has passed in 2011 and 
2012, large companies exhibit an order of magnitude more activity than small stocks. 
Figure IV-2: HFT Flags per 1 Million Shares Traded, by Size Terciles 
Notes: This chart shows daily averages and quantiles of HFT_volume_rate, defined as the daily 
number of HFT flags per 1 million shares trading volume. The y-axis is log-transformed. The daily 
mean is calculated across all stocks. All remaining time series represent one-year (252 day) centered 
moving averages of daily cross-sectional statistics. 
Moving averages of daily means are given for Large/Medium/Small terciles by market capitalization, 
with firms ranked by their average market capitalization in the full period. The daily 5% and 95% 
percentiles indicate the upper and lower boundaries of distributions across stocks. 
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Figure 3 shows that increases in HFT activity coincide with increases in IEE. 
Peaks in extreme event severity also coincide with peaks in market volatility, (e.g. in 
the financial crisis of 2008/2009, and the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010), and one can 
also see seasonal patterns in IEE similar to those discussed above for HFT proxies. To 
make the comparison clearer, we compare IEE with a detrended version of the 1-year 
quasi-market-share time series from Figure 1. This adjusts for the strong growth in 
HFT activity over time, and allows us to focus on the residual variation around the 
trend. Viewed this way, HFT and IEE seem to be quite related. Their trends, peaks 
and troughs largely align, both for the mean and the outer quantiles (5/95%) of stocks’ 
IEE values. 
Figure IV-3: Intraday Extreme Events and Variations in HFT Quoting Activity 
Notes: This chart displays aggregates of intraday extreme event (IEE) values and a detrended proxy of 
HFT quoting activity. It shows daily IEE means as well as one-year centered moving averages of the 
daily 5% and 95% percentiles of IEE.  
The HFT proxy is defined as the one-year centered moving average of daily percentages of stock 
minutes with at least one HFT quote activity flag (see calculation in Figure 1). The detrended HFT 
proxy represents the residuals of a regression of the one-year average HFT proxy with a time-trend 
variable (rescaled to the value range of IEE in this figure). 
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From the initial analysis of HFT activity, we learn that it has grown 
substantially over time, both within stocks and in terms of market penetration. There 
are indications of a staggered rollout pattern in the market, with large, more liquid 
stocks being the first to exhibit significant levels of HFT, and temporary increases in 
HFT appear coincident with similar increases in IEE. It is not yet evident, however, 
whether this correlation reflects a causal relationship. Co-movement in IEE and HFT, 
by itself, does not allow inferring causality. Market participants might engage in HFT 
in a given stock because extreme events provide attractive trading opportunities. Both 
variables might be driven by variations in volatility and liquidity over time and across 
stocks. Nevertheless, this observation motivates the instrumental variable approach 
we take in the subsequent section. 
4. Exogenous Shocks to HFT Activity 
In econometric terms, the observed HFT proxy variables are endogenous to the 
system we are trying to analyze. This allows no causal inference for HFT’s effect on 
IEE in a standard regression. To disentangle the causal relationship between the 
variables, we follow the approach used in several previous studies on the effects of 
HFT on market characteristics: using an exogenous shock to HFT activity as an 
instrumental variable in a panel regression. The two shocks to HFT activity that we 
use as instruments were both actions by the SEC: the introduction of Regulation NMS 
and the Naked Access Ban (Chung & Chuwonganant, 2012). 
4.1. The Rollout of Regulation NMS 
On August 29, 2005, the SEC adopted Regulation NMS (hereafter Reg. NMS), a 
collection of rules which redefined the operations of U.S. equity markets with the goal 
of promoting liquidity, transparency and efficiency (SEC, 2005). As with many 
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regulations, it did not have exactly the anticipated effect. Indeed industry observers 
such as TABB Group note: 
“Reg. NMS started a progression of technology changes that […] prioritized 
speed over liquidity, […] fragmented the markets, drove ever-increasing messaging 
rates, created order-type complexity, and arguably enabled high frequency traders to 
take advantage of the very investors Reg. NMS was intended to protect, while actually 
making the markets less transparent for regulators.” (Tabb, 2013) 
Within Reg. NMS, the rule creating the most profound structural changes was 
Rule 611, the “Order Protection Rule”, which established intermarket-protection 
against so-called trade-throughs, i.e., situations where one exchange would execute an 
order, despite a better price being available on another exchange. Implementing this 
protection effectively required interlinking all exchanges with one another to establish 
the “National Best Bid and Offer Price” (NBBO, see also SEC, 2005). Long 
geographical distances between exchanges and lags created by the process of 
aggregating all quotes to determine the current NBBO created the opportunity for 
HFTs. The SEC is well aware of this:  
“Some proprietary firm’s strategies may exploit structural vulnerabilities in the 
market or in certain market participants. For example, by obtaining the fastest 
delivery of market data through co-location arrangements and individual trading 
center data feeds, proprietary firms theoretically could profit by identifying market 
participants who are offering execution at stale prices.” (SEC, 2010) 
The ability to obtain prices faster than the rest of the public provided a significant 
economic incentive to invest and engage in HFT. McInish & Upson (2012) confirm 
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this, showing the substantial profitability of NBBO-based latency arbitrage with an 
estimated profit of over $200 million annually for this strategy alone.  
The implementation of Reg. NMS required substantial investments in market 
infrastructure, so that its final effective date was extended well into 2007. Full 
functional compliance with the main rules, including the “Order Protection Rule” was 
implemented in stages. 250 stocks (100 each from NYSE and NASDAQ, 50 from 
AMEX) were selected for a “Pilot Stocks Phase” from July 9 to August 20, 2007, with 
the rest of the market following thereafter (“All Stocks Phase”). For our purpose of 
investigating the effect of HFT on intraday extreme events, this staggered rollout is 
highly valuable. It constitutes a natural experiment, which allows comparing treated 
and untreated entities. In this case, the 96 “Pilot Stocks” in our sample can be 
compared to the rest of the population. Using a panel regression approach controls for 
changes in observed market conditions, as well as unobserved effects in individual 
days and firms, so that we can focus on the incremental effect from the exogenous 
shock to HFT from Reg. NMS.  
If the economic incentives from Reg. NMS were indeed a positive shock to 
HFT, Reg. NMS might be a suitable instrument for our endogenous HFT proxy 
variables. A valid instrument has to satisfy the condition that it influences the 
dependent variable IEE only through its effect on HFT. This means that we have to be 
in a position to reasonably make the untestable assumption that (1) Reg. NMS does 
not influence IEE directly, (2) the reverse, i.e. IEE does not influence Reg. NMS, and 
that (3) there are no confounding Reg. NMS effects on IEE through other omitted 
variables. For requirement (2), it is helpful that the rollout schedule had been defined 
well in advance and also extended several times (SEC, 2007), so that we can 
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confidently rule out an impact of IEE on the choice of stocks for the Reg. NMS 
rollout. For requirement (3), the stock and time fixed effects in a panel regression can 
compensate for biases, for instance, if particularly large or liquid stocks had been 
chosen for the “Pilot Stocks Phase”. Finally, for requirement (1), we argue that, while 
there are well-defined technological changes and economic incentives for HFT traders 
to increase their activity, it is tough to make a case for other market participants 
changing their behavior significantly in a way that would influence volatility.19 
Hence, we have good reasons to assume that Reg. NMS constitutes a valid exogenous 
instrument for HFT.  
4.2. The SEC Naked Access Ban 
On November 30, 2011, the SEC “Naked Access Ban” (hereafter NAB) took effect. 
The rule banned a practice by broker/dealers providing their customers unfiltered 
(“naked”) market access without any pre-order checks and monitoring of exposures 
(SEC, 2011). The practice of bypassing brokers’ risk management checks allowed 
saving valuable fractions of seconds and was therefore heavily used by HFT20. Most 
importantly, the lack of monitoring and pre-order checks – with regard to exposures 
that could arise from the orders sent by the client – enabled HFT strategies involving 
high quote-volume order and cancellation sequences.  
By banning this practice, the SEC substantially limited the scope to send an 
unlimited number of orders directly to exchanges. Representing an expected negative 
shock to HFT, the NAB provides an opportunity to study the effect of HFT trading on 
intraday extreme events. Better still, it covers a very different time period and market 
                                                 
19See Hendershott et al. (2011) for a thorough discussion of the requirements in context of a panel regression 
framework 
20For a more detailed analyses of the rules and mechanisms involved, see Chakrabarty et al. (2014) 
IV. E.3 – High Frequency Trading Intensifies Intraday Extreme Events 
IV-25 
environment (2011, post financial crisis) compared to the time of the Reg. NMS 
rollout. Finally, analyzing a negative exogenous shock to HFT, undoing some of the 
growth spurred by Reg. NMS, provides a valuable validation opportunity.  
Again, we have to be able to make the requisite assumptions for NAB to 
constitute a valid instrument for HFT. First, NAB should not influence IEE directly 
but only through HFT. This seems likely as the regulation directly targeted unfiltered 
market access heavily used by HFT, whereas for normal investors, naked access does 
not provide operational benefits. Second and inversely, that IEE has not influenced 
NAB seems reasonable given the SEC communication of its adoption well in advance. 
Finally, that other omitted variables with an influence on IEE confound our results at 
exactly the same time as the NAB introduction date seems unlikely, and, in case 
unobserved effects vary across stocks, the panel regression stock fixed effects can 
adjust for this. NAB has also been used as an exogenous instrumental variable for 
HFT activity in a recent working paper by Chakrabarty et al. (2014), and for our 
instrumental variable regressions involving NAB, we also borrow from their 
regression specification. 
5. Empirical Findings 
To investigate the effect of HFT on intraday extreme events, we use an instrumental 
variables approach, relying on the introduction of Reg. NMS and the Naked Access 
Ban as instruments. We construct subsamples for the periods in which the exogenous 
factors are active. In line with Hendershott et al. (2011), we exclude stocks with 
incomplete data to obtain a balanced panel, use standard price filters (stocks between 
$5 and $1000 during the sample period), and exclude small cap stocks below $250 
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million average market capitalization. This yields 1,197 stocks for the Regulation 
NMS sample, and 1,374 stocks for the Naked Access Ban sample, respectively21. The 
Regulation NMS “Pilot Stocks Phase” spanned the period from July 9 to August 20, 
2007, and we follow Hendershott et al. (2011) and extend the sample by two months 
before and after, resulting in a period from May 9 to October 22, 2007. We construct 
the second sample for the Naked Access Ban in similar fashion, resulting in a period 
from October 3, 2011 to January 31, 2012, centered on the November 30, 2011 
effective date for the ban. To keep track of the numerous different events, phases, and 
sample periods, Figure 4 provides a convenient overview.  
Figure IV-4: Timeline of Events, Phases and Sample Periods 
Notes: This graph summarizes important events and phases referenced throughout the paper, and the 
start and end dates of the data and subsamples. Abbreviations 2M and 6W refer to periods of 2 months 
and 6 weeks, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the data for the two market phases covered by the 
subsamples. Compared to the Reg. NMS period in 2007, the level of HFT activity is 
much higher in the 2011/12 NAB sample, whereas the overall level of IEE is 
somewhat lower, possibly reflecting a calmer post-crisis market environment. 
  
                                                 
21For the Reg. NMS sample universe of 1,293 stocks with data in 2007, 72 stocks are removed due to missing data 
in the sample period, 19 are excluded due to price, and five due to size. For the NAB sample we start with 1,465 
stocks with data in 2011, 10 stocks thereof are removed due to missing data, 76 due to price and five due to size. 
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Table IV-2: Subsample Summary Statistics 
Notes: This table provides an overview of the two regression sample periods for the main regression 
variables. Following the approach for the regressions, we calculate statistics for the full sample and 
size terciles (Large, Medium, Small) by average market capitalization in the respective periods. 
“Within” standard deviation indicates the time series variation, averaged across stocks. “Across” 
standard deviation shows the variation of period means in the cross-section. The balanced panel 
samples for Regulation NMS (Panel A) and Naked Access Ban (Panel B) subperiods contain 1,197 and 
1,374 stocks, respectively. 
 
5.1. Effect of Exogenous Shocks on HFT Activity 
To test for effects of Reg. NMS on HFT and control variables as dependent variables 
Depit we use the following specification: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾௧ + 𝛽𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ (6) 
where αi and γt are stock and day fixed effects, and 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ is the Regulation 
NMS introduction dummy variable. For each stock i, 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ is zero for all days before 
the stock-specific rollout date and one thereafter. Including day-specific fixed effects 
removes any time trends in dependent variables, and effectively compares the change 
in 𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧ for Reg. NMS pilot stocks with that of the non-pilot stocks. 
IEE HFT_flags HFT_vol.rate Volatility Price Size Turnover
(x-times (# flags / (# flags / 1m (percent) ($) ($ (percent
id. vola.) day) shares) billions) of float)
Panel A: NMS Sample - May 9 to October 22, 2007
All stocks Mean 5.42 49.1 38.6 2.84 45.10 17.98 0.95
Median 4.59 8.0 6.3 2.37 36.81 5.06 0.63
Std Within 3.11 61.3 65.7 1.58 3.60 1.25 0.56
Std Across 0.56 83.7 50.4 0.87 41.49 38.70 0.84
Large Mean 5.32 97.4 49.9 2.44 59.99 46.60 0.64
Median 4.58 35.0 13.2 2.07 48.89 24.61 0.44
Medium Mean 5.43 34.7 38.0 2.79 44.08 5.56 0.92
Median 4.60 6.0 6.0 2.32 37.75 5.06 0.63
Small Mean 5.51 15.2 27.8 3.29 31.24 1.77 1.31
Median 4.60 1.0 1.8 2.74 27.50 1.71 0.89
Panel B: NAB Sample - October 3, 2011 to January 31, 2012
All stocks Mean 3.92 497.7 222.0 3.18 39.69 14.20 1.19
Median 3.59 107.0 91.5 2.70 31.28 4.15 0.83
Std Within 1.55 339.4 202.5 1.48 2.76 0.82 0.65
Std Across 0.33 807.7 363.7 1.16 42.25 30.60 1.03
Large Mean 3.82 1,065.1 328.3 2.50 53.69 36.52 0.85
Median 3.55 529.0 174.0 2.18 42.22 19.02 0.66
Medium Mean 3.91 313.1 197.4 3.11 39.26 4.59 1.24
Median 3.59 95.0 90.4 2.65 32.61 4.15 0.88
Small Mean 4.01 115.0 140.3 3.92 26.13 1.49 1.48
Median 3.62 25.0 47.8 3.38 21.65 1.46 1.01
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We use a similar specification for the Naked Access Ban period, replacing the 
γt day fixed effect with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧, a linear time trend variable, due to the absence of a 
staggered rollout in 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧, which would allow us to separately identify day-specific 
fixed effects: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ + 𝛽𝑁𝐴𝐵௧ + 𝜀௜௧ (7) 
The results for these regressions strongly suggest that Reg. NMS and the 
Naked Access Ban substantially influenced HFT activity, with Reg. NMS leading to a 
substantial increase and the NAB leading to a substantial decrease. This can be seen in 
Table 3, where the coefficient on the 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ dummy for all stocks indicates that the 
introduction of Reg. NMS increases HFT flags by about 40 per day, an increase of 80 
percent over the overall sample mean of roughly 50 (see Table 2).  
Table IV-3: Reg. NMS Rollout Effect on HFT Proxy and Control Variables 
Notes: This table shows the effect of the Regulation NMS introduction on HFT proxies and other 
covariates used in this study. The model specification uses each variable as dependent variable 
𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧  in the reduced form 1st stage regression (Equation 6): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾௧ + 𝛽𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ 
where 𝛼௜ and 𝛾௧ are stock and day fixed effects, and 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧  is the Regulation NMS introduction dummy 
variable (zero for all days before the stock-specific rollout date and one thereafter). We run the 
regression for all stocks as well as for size terciles (Large, Medium and Small) by stocks’ average 
market capitalization in the sample period. The sample covers the period from May 9 to October 22, 
2007, which includes the Regulation NMS rollout period from July 9 to August 20, 2007, plus/minus 
two trading months. 
  
 
The log-transformed HFT proxies, which reduce the impact of the substantial 
absolute differences in HFT activity levels across stocks, still imply a 30% increase 
            All stocks
Reg. NMS Effect (β) Large Medium Small
on HFT proxies:
HFT_flags 42.6 *** 37.2 *** 38.6 *** 12.2 **
log. HFT_flags 0.29 *** 0.27 *** 0.20 *** 0.17 **
log. HFT_vol.rate 0.32 *** 0.24 *** 0.15 ** 0.40 ***
on Control variables:
Volatility -0.090 * 0.123 * 0.033 -0.415 ***
1/Price 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.001 ** -0.001 **
log. Size -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.007 -0.001
Turnover 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.001 ** -0.001 **
Significance levels: *** <.001,  ** <.01,  * <.05
# observations: 1,197 * 114 (stocks * days)
Size Terciles
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for both HFT activity measures. All significance estimates are based on standard 
errors double clustered across firms and time22. By contrast, coefficients on control 
variables are inconsistent and economically insignificant. Taken together, it is clear 
that Reg. NMS was a significant positive shock to HFT. 
Table IV-4: SEC Naked Access Ban Effect on HFT Proxy and Control Variables 
Notes: This table shows the effect of the SEC Naked Access Ban on HFT proxies and other covariates 
used in this study. The model specification uses each variable as dependent variable 𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧  in the 
reduced form 1st stage regression (Equation 7): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ + 𝛽𝑁𝐴𝐵௧ + 𝜀௜௧ 
where 𝛼௜ is a stock fixed effect, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧  is a linear time-trend variable, and 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧  is the Naked Access 
Ban dummy variable (zero prior to November 30, 2011 and 1 thereafter). Due to the lack of cross-
sectional variation in 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧ , 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ replaces the day fixed effect (see specification in Table 3) to 
account for potential slow-moving variation in other unobserved variables that might influence the 
dependent variables. We run the regression for all stocks as well as for size terciles (Large, Medium 
and Small) by stocks’ average market capitalization in the sample period. The sample covers the period 
from October 3, 2011 to January 31, 2012, which includes the SEC Naked Access Ban (NAB) rollout 
day (November 30, 2011) plus/minus 2 months. 
 
By contrast, the Naked Access Ban substantially decreased HFT, as seen in 
Table 4, reducing HFT activity by roughly one third, similar to the findings of 
Chakrabarty et al. (2014). The control variables exhibit economically larger and more 
significant coefficients on 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧ than in the previous analysis on 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧. This is due 
to the fact that we cannot use day fixed effects in the regression equation (7), so that 
deviations above and below the linear time trend can show up as significant 
coefficients for 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧. For example, for the NAB effect on Volatility, the point 
                                                 
22To estimate regressions with a high number of factor levels, we use the fixed effects implementation in R by 
Gaure (2013). 
            All stocks             All stocks
NAB Effect (β) Large Medium Small Trend (γ)
on HFT proxies:
HFT_flags -166.8 *** -362.3 *** -82.7 *** -55.5 *** -2.86 ***
log. HFT_flags -0.24 *** -0.29 *** -0.18 *** -0.25 *** -0.01 ***
log. HFT_vol.rate -0.23 *** -0.27 *** -0.15 *** -0.28 *** -0.01 ***
on Control variables:
Volatility 0.322 *** 0.267 *** 0.278 *** 0.420 *** -0.030 ***
1/Price 0.000 *** 0.000 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 * 0.000 ***
log. Size -0.055 *** -0.046 *** -0.056 *** -0.064 *** 0.002 ***
Turnover 0.000 *** 0.000 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 * 0.000 ***
Significance levels: *** <.001,  ** <.01,  * <.05
# observations: 1,374 * 82 (stocks * days)
Size Terciles
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estimate of 0.32 for the full sample implies below-trend volatility before the effective 
date of the ban and above-trend volatility thereafter, but not necessarily higher 
absolute volatility23.  
5.2. Effect of HFT Activity on Intraday Extreme Events 
To identify causal effects from HFT on intraday extreme events, we use the staggered 
introduction of Regulation NMS and the introduction of the Naked Access Ban as 
exogenous instruments for HFT proxies in the two subsamples. The dependent 
variable is the square root of IEE measures as defined in equation (5) and we use log-
transformed HFT proxy variables24 for the following regression specification in the 
Regulation NMS sample: 
 ඥ𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾௧ + 𝛽log(1 + 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧) + 𝛿𝑋௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ (8) 
where αi and γt are stock and day fixed effects, 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ is the selected HFT 
proxy variable (𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧ or 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧) and 𝑋௜௧ is a vector of control 
variables (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦௜௧, 1/𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒௜௧, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧, and 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟௜௧). Note that in the 
instrumental variable approach 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ is first regressed against the Reg. NMS dummy 
𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ and all other explanatory variables to determine the exogenous source of 
variation in HFT. Price and size are lagged by one period, but in contrast to Boehmer 
et al. (2012), we use contemporaneous volatility and turnover, due to their high time 
series variance in order to ensure that they accurately control for the expected level of 
                                                 
23The 𝛾 = −0.03 coefficient on the linear trend variable Trendt suggests that on average, pre-NAB volatility is 1.2 
percent higher than post-NAB volatility (40 trading days average difference * 0.03). 
24The economic rationale comes from the intuition that IEE captures price shocks reflecting the market impact of 
large order imbalances. Models for transitory market impact (e.g., Almgren, 2005) follow concave functions of 
relative volume with exponents around 0.5 for the dependent variable. In addition, residual distributions are 
more symmetrical for ඥ𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ compared to log(𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧). In any case, regression results are robust against 
changing the transformations of both IEE and HFT variables. 
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IEE intensity given potential news shocks and resulting trading activity on the same 
day. 
Table IV-5: Effect of HFT Activity on Daily Intraday Extreme Events using Regulation NMS 
Rollout as Instrument for HFT 
Notes: This table shows the regression results for daily intraday extreme events (𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧) on two proxies 
for HFT activity (𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧). The sample covers the period from May 9 to October 22, 2007, which 
includes the Regulation NMS rollout period from July 9 to August 20, 2007, plus/minus two trading 
months. We run the regressions for all stocks as well as for size terciles (Large, Medium and Small) by 
stocks’ average market capitalization in the sample period. For all regressions, we use the staggered 
rollout of Regulation NMS as instrument for the endogenous HFT proxy variables 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ to isolate the 
causal effect of HFT on IEE. The specification is (Equation 8): 
ඥ𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾௧ + 𝛽log(1 + 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧) + 𝛿𝑋௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ 
where 𝛼௜ and 𝛾௧ are stock and day fixed effects, 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ is the selected HFT proxy variable 
(𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧  or 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧) and 𝑋௜௧  is a vector of control variables (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦௜௧, 
1/𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒௜௧ , 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧) and 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟௜௧). Panel A regresses 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ on 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧ , the daily number 
of seconds per stock with at least 100 quotes per trade, Panel B regresses 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧  on 
𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧ , the daily number of HFT activity flags per 1 million shares traded. The right-
most column of each panel reports the coefficients in the 1st-stage of the 2-step instrumental variable 
regression, which regresses 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ on 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧  and controls. In addition, F-statistics are shown for a 
Wald-Test of the significance for 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧  entering the 1st stage regression. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the instrumental variable regression, using 
𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧ (Panel A) and 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧ (Panel B) as HFT proxies. We find 
an economically and statistically significant effect of HFT activity on intraday 
extreme events for large stocks but not for smaller stocks. The HFT regression 
coefficients of 0.18 for large stocks imply that a doubling of HFT activity compared 
Panel A: IEE on HFT_flags
All stocks Coeff. 0.121 0.196 0.875 0.021 3.357 Coeff. 0.293
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.172 0.437 0.000 *** F-stat. 112.08
Large Coeff. 0.175 0.226 4.514 -0.065 3.415 Coeff. 0.263
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.248 0.000 *** F-stat. 58.06
Medium Coeff. 0.021 0.205 -4.720 0.022 5.906 Coeff. 0.191
Pr(>|t|) 0.843 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.735 0.001 *** F-stat. (9.64)
Small Coeff. -0.134 0.186 -1.229 0.172 7.451 Coeff. 0.214
Pr(>|t|) 0.161 0.000 *** 0.416 0.001 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 12.49
Panel B: IEE on HFT_volume_rate
All stocks Coeff. 0.108 0.200 0.311 0.002 6.126 Coeff. 0.328
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.587 0.944 0.000 *** F-stat. 116.76
Large Coeff. 0.177 0.235 4.168 -0.079 10.405 Coeff. 0.260
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.185 0.000 *** F-stat. 54.95
Medium Coeff. 0.024 0.206 -4.702 0.017 6.567 Coeff. 0.168
Pr(>|t|) 0.843 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.851 0.000 *** F-stat. (6.36)
Small Coeff. -0.070 0.182 -0.006 0.174 5.099 Coeff. 0.410
Pr(>|t|) 0.132 0.000 *** 0.994 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 32.58
Significance levels: *** <.001,  ** <.01,  * <.05
# observations: 1,197 * 114 (stocks * days)
HFT_flags on NMS
HFT_v.rate on NMS
(1st stage regression)
log. HFT_vol.rate Volatility 1/Price log. Size Turnover (1st stage regression)
log. HFT_flags Volatility 1/Price log. Size Turnover
( ): Wald F-stat < 10
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to trading volume leads to an increase in 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ of 0.6, or the largest price moves per 
day grow from 5.3 to “5.9-times sigma”, which represents a more than 10% increase 
in severity25. This example is just for a doubling in HFT activity. Yet the actual time 
series variation of HFT activity easily reaches factors of 5 to 10 for daily data and 
several orders of magnitude intraday. As a result, bursts of HFT activity could have 
much larger effects. 
The right column in Table 5 also shows the coefficients and the F-Test for 
instrument 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ entering the 1st stage regression for each model. The F-values show 
clearly that the instrument is much weaker for medium and small stocks. This lack of 
statistical power mirrors the results by Hendershott et al. (2011) who argue that their 
instrument might be weaker for smaller stocks because of less time series variation in 
these groups. Indeed, the 96 stocks in our sample belonging to the NMS pilot stocks 
per July 9, 2007, are concentrated in large stocks (49 stocks), with medium and small 
terciles relatively underrepresented (19 and 18 pilot stocks, respectively). Beyond 
that, we know that HFT activity is an order of magnitude higher for large stocks than 
for smaller stocks, so that the effective HFT-increase in small stocks due to Reg. 
NMS is economically tiny in comparison. Finally, it also fits to our insight from 
descriptive analysis in section 3.4: when resource-constrained traders invest in 
additional HFT capacity, they are more likely to apply it first to large stocks offering 
the greatest profit opportunities. In sum, the concentration of HFT-effects in large 
stocks fits well to economic and statistical circumstances. 
                                                 
25Calculation: using the IEE sample average of 5.3 for large companies (see table 2), we get 
൫√5.3 + 0.18 ∗ log(2)൯
ଶ
= (2.3 + 0.12)ଶ = 5.3 + 0.6, where 0.6 is the HFT effect. 
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The findings from the NAB sample confirm these results. The specification for 
the Naked Access Ban regressions differs from the Reg. NMS regressions only by 
replacing time fixed effects γt by 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧.and 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧.by 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧.as instrument for HFT. 
The results indicate that HFT activity has a substantial impact on intraday extreme 
events, not just for large stocks but all size groups. Full sample coefficients on HFT 
are roughly three times larger than in the Reg. NMS period. The economic rationale 
for the increase in significance for medium and small market capitalization stocks has 
two potential drivers. First, the intensity of HFT activity in these stocks is an order of 
magnitude higher in 2011 than it was in 2007. Second, the NAB effect does not 
depend on resource prioritization decisions by HFT firms, since the ban limits order 
submission in general.Table 6 reports the regression results using 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧ as an 
instrument for HFT proxy variables. We follow Chakrabarty et al. (2014) and use the 
following specification, derived from equation (8): 
 ඥ𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ + 𝛽 log(1 + 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧) + 𝛿𝑋௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ (9) 
The specification for the Naked Access Ban regressions differs from the Reg. 
NMS regressions only by replacing time fixed effects γt by 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ and 𝑁𝑀𝑆௜௧ by 
𝑁𝐴𝐵௧ as instrument for HFT. The results indicate that HFT activity has a substantial 
impact on intraday extreme events, not just for large stocks but all size groups. Full 
sample coefficients on HFT are roughly three times larger than in the Reg. NMS 
period. The economic rationale for the increase in significance for medium and small 
market capitalization stocks has two potential drivers. First, the intensity of HFT 
activity in these stocks is an order of magnitude higher in 2011 than it was in 2007. 
Second, the NAB effect does not depend on resource prioritization decisions by HFT 
firms, since the ban limits order submission in general. 
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Table IV-6: Effect of HFT Activity on Daily Intraday Extreme Events using SEC Naked Access 
Ban as instrument for HFT 
Notes: This table shows the regression results for daily intraday extreme events (𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧) on two proxies 
for HFT activity (𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧). The sample covers the period from October 3, 2011 to January 31, 2012, 
which includes the SEC Naked Access Ban (NAB) rollout day (November 30, 2011) plus/minus 2 
months. We run the regressions for all stocks as well as for size terciles (Large, Medium and Small) by 
stocks’ average market capitalization in the sample period. For all regressions, we use the Naked 
Access Ban as instrument for the endogenous HFT proxy variables 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ to infer the causal effect of 
HFT on IEE. The specification is (Equation 9): 
ඥ𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ + 𝛽log(1 + 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧) + 𝛿𝑋௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ 
where 𝛼௜ is a stock fixed effect, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑௧ is a linear time-trend variable, 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ is the selected HFT proxy 
variable (𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧ or 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧) and 𝑋௜௧  is a vector of control variables (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦௜௧ , 
1/𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒௜௧ , 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧) and 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟௜௧). Panel A regresses 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧ on 𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠௜௧ , the daily number 
of seconds per stock with at least 100 quotes per trade, Panel B regresses 𝐼𝐸𝐸௜௧  on 
𝐻𝐹𝑇_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௜௧ , the daily number of HFT activity flags per 1 million shares traded. The right-
most column of each panel reports the coefficients in the 1st-stage of the 2-step instrumental variable 
regression, which regresses 𝐻𝐹𝑇௜௧ on 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧  and controls. In addition, F-statistics are shown for a 
Wald-Test of the significance for 𝑁𝐴𝐵௧  entering the 1st stage regression. 
 
In sum, the instrumental variable regressions strongly suggest that HFT 
activity exacerbates extreme intraday price moves, particularly for large stocks. The 
findings are consistent across very different market periods – summer 2007 and the 
end of 2011 – as well as different model specifications26. 
                                                 
26In addition to the NAB validation, we have also tested models including the lagged dependent variable, different 
variable transformations (e.g. using raw IEE), and differently defined or lagged control variables. To check if 
intraday effects drive our results, we have also tested extended specifications using (1) intraday HFT activity 
measured contemporaneously to the respective daily extreme events, (2) contemporaneous turnover as control 
Panel A: IEE on HFT flags
All stocks Coeff. 0.487 0.117 5.545 -0.170 4.724 0.006 Coeff. -0.208
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 96.68
Large Coeff. 0.437 0.154 1.411 -0.400 7.998 0.007 Coeff. -0.264
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.226 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 31.40
Medium Coeff. 0.658 0.115 9.695 0.018 5.448 0.010 Coeff. -0.156
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.772 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 34.98
Small Coeff. 0.431 0.100 4.999 -0.150 4.278 0.004 Coeff. -0.207
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.006 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 31.51
Panel B: IEE on HFT volume rate
All stocks Coeff. 0.531 0.137 4.708 -0.337 19.931 0.006 Coeff. -0.191
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 96.68
Large Coeff. 0.498 0.184 -0.465 -0.581 29.033 0.007 Coeff. -0.231
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.746 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 31.40
Medium Coeff. 0.798 0.142 6.798 -0.302 30.447 0.011 Coeff. -0.129
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 34.98
Small Coeff. 0.408 0.114 4.622 -0.216 14.497 0.004 Coeff. -0.219
Pr(>|t|) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** F-stat. 31.51
Significance levels: *** <.001,  ** <.01,  * <.05
# observations: 1,374 * 82 (stocks * days)
HFT_flags on NAB
HFT_v.rate on NAB
Trend (1st stage regression)
log. HFT_vol.rate Volatility 1/Price log. Size Turnover Trend (1st stage regression)
log. HFT_flags Volatility 1/Price log. Size Turnover
( ): Wald F-stat < 10
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6. Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact of HFT activity on intraday extreme events in U.S. 
stock returns. This question is raised by the empirical literature, where several authors 
find largely positive HFT effects on aggregate market quality, but at the same time 
call into question HFT’s role in turbulent markets. Moreover, market observers and 
researchers report aggressive HFT strategies, which might cause non-fundamental 
volatility. Beyond stand-alone HFT actions, researchers suggest interaction 
mechanisms by which HFT exacerbates extreme events. With several investigations 
of the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, the literature provides situational evidence that 
high frequency traders – while not causing the crash – contributed to extreme 
downside volatility. 
This paper adds empirical evidence to the HFT debate, focusing on the role of 
HFT in causing market turbulence. We measure intraday extreme events as the size of 
a stock’s daily largest intraday up and down price moves compared to its typical 
intraday volatility during the same times of day. Using an instrumental variable 
approach with Regulation NMS (summer 2007) and the SEC Naked Access Ban 
(winter 2011/2011) as exogenous shocks to HFT, we show that increased activity by 
high frequency traders causes more severe intraday extreme events. Put differently, 
tail events become larger. This finding is not limited to single market events, but is 
robust across two widely different market periods – before and after the financial 
crisis of 2008/2009, before and after the massive growth in HFT market penetration – 
and for a positive and a negative exogenous shock to HFT, respectively. The results 
add to our understanding of the market quality effects of HFT, and relativize some of 
                                                 
variable and (3) time of day effects. For the sake of brevity, these regressions are not reported here since they 
deliver comparable results. 
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the positive effects of HFT found in previous studies. Overall, while there are positive 
effects of HFT, they are paid for at least in part by ordinary investors who have to 
accept more fragile market conditions.  
Numerous mechanisms could be responsible for this empirical finding. HFT 
liquidity supply can vanish in fractions of a second if market conditions suggest it is 
profit maximizing for high frequency traders to exit the market. Furthermore, in 
pursuit of licit profit motives, some of the algorithms used by high frequency traders 
directly reduce market quality and increase trading costs for ordinary investors in 
numerous ways. As a category of market participants, they operate close to physical 
speed limits and therefore must follow correlated strategies. This introduces new 
positive-feedback mechanisms which could be responsible for larger tail events. To 
determine which subset of HFT behaviors or interaction mechanisms is responsible 
for the finding of more intense extreme events, is beyond the scope and data of this 
study but an important avenue for research. Tail risks and more generally non-
fundamental volatility are costs to both investors and issuers, and hence, overall 
welfare implications of HFT are yet unclear.  
For future research, the design of more robust market systems, and the 
conception of rules directing technological innovations in financial markets towards 
positive effects on market quality, is an open question. Assessing the welfare effects 
of HFT, as well as market design choices in response, requires more detailed analysis 
using full order book data and identifying the actions and impacts of individual HFT 
firms and strategies. 
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V. Conclusions and Implications for Research 
This chapter summarizes the contributions of the essays to their respective literatures, 
including new publications, and derives up-to-date implications for further research. 
1. Essay 1 – Improving Performance of Corporate Rating 
Prediction Models by Reducing Financial Ratio Heterogeneity 
The contribution of this essay to the literature is twofold. First, the approach to reduce 
financial ratio heterogeneity fills a methodological gap in cases where a data sample 
characterized by economically diverse groups is too small to construct separate rating 
models. Second, by laying out a framework of performance levers – factor definition, 
factor transformation and the choice of classification algorithm – we have provided a 
toolkit to future researchers in credit risk modeling. 
Since its publication in 2008, the article has been cited by numerous later 
published studies and working papers. The particular issue we faced – building a 
multi-industry model in the small customer segment of large corporates – has not 
received much scholarly attention. In the much larger customer segments of small and 
mid-sized companies, industry or regional heterogeneity can be addressed more 
efficiently by constructing different group-specific models (Karas & Režňáková, 
2015). The authors also show that different predictors are relevant for different sectors 
and regions; therefore, separate models are the superior approach.  
Most citations refer to our second contribution, the framework of performance 
levers. Karas & Režňáková (2013), completely follow its steps and also employ Box-
Cox transformation to normalize predictor variables. Plus, the field has advanced 
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significantly with respect to classification algorithms. At the time of our study, we 
concluded that there is little potential for further performance increases by using 
better algorithms. Therefore we focused on improving predictive power by extracting 
better features from the data and transforming them so that they are statistically well-
behaved in the model. Kukuk & Rönnberg (2012) as well as Karas & Režňáková 
(2014) reference our conclusion and show that new classification algorithms do in fact 
increase predictive power. Also, increases in available computational power have led 
to the use of much more complex algorithms such as decision trees (Delen et al., 
2013; Olson et al., 2012) and semi-parametric methods (Hwang et al., 2010).  
Regarding the other performance levers, factor definition, selection and 
transformation, there have also been numerous advancements. Several studies 
(Hernandez Tinoco & Wilson, 2013; Li & Miu, 2010) have combined financial ratio 
information with macro-economic variables and financial market variables to achieve 
improved predictive power. Our idea of extracting additional information from multi-
year transformations of financial ratios is picked up by Volkov & Van den Poel 
(2012), who show that sequences of financial ratios increase performance. For 
variable selection, our study used stepwise regression to find a “core model” of the 
top four or five most significant predictors, and then proceeded with manual variable 
selection. Tian et al. (2015) show that advanced algorithms such as LASSO are able 
to select robust variable combinations without further manual intervention. 
In sum, it appears safe to state that the best credit risk models will combine 
advanced classification algorithms with multiple sources of predictive factors – 
beyond accounting data and financial ratios, and explicitly addressing country and 
industry level effects – and factor transformations to achieve optimal performance. 
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2. Essay 2 – Exploiting Attention-Driven Mispricing: Evidence 
from Actual-Dollar Trading 
This essay contributes to three literatures in financial economics: tests of market 
efficiency, studies on recommendation and attention effects on asset prices, and 
finally, on the limits of arbitrage.  
In the literature on market efficiency, this study appears to be the first 
performing an out-of-sample test with real money. Some recent studies come close to 
this validation approach by observing other traders investing real money (e.g. 
Seasholes & Wu, 2007). Furthermore, instead of relying on in-sample results, recent 
studies take the realistic perspective of a real-time optimizing investor, by evaluating 
the out-of-sample performance of trading strategies (Fang et al., 2014) and asset 
pricing models (Lewellen, 2015) in a walk-forward test. The essay’s second 
contribution is the finding of an economically small but statistically significant market 
inefficiency. To constitute a large-scale deviation from market efficiency, future 
research would have to show that the phenomena driving the strategy’s profits – (1) 
attention-driven mispricing (Engelberg et al., 2012) and (2) the observed intraday 
dynamics during its reversal (first shown in this essay) – are pervasive. 
Recent studies such as Yuan (2015) and (Zhang & Wang, 2015) indicate that 
attention effects apply universally. This makes sense given that real-life investors 
suffer from bounded rationality: they cannot process unlimited amounts of 
information and therefore have to focus their mental capabilities on stocks that pique 
their interest. Attention determines where investors allocate their limited research time 
to acquire firm-specific information (Dong & Ni, 2014). Attention translates into 
different speeds of how the market prices new information (Drake et al., 2015). Yuan 
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(2015) shows that market-wide attention effects have market-wide impact on returns, 
whereas Zhang & Wang (2015) show that attention-driven mispricings and 
subsequent reversals are prevalent in the Chinese stock market. Attention effects are 
not limited to the stock market, they occur in the forex markets as well (Goddard et 
al., 2015). To this literature on attention, and as a subset of that, the literature on 
recommendation effects, the essay contributes two findings. First, it answers the 
question raised by Engelberg et al. (2012) by showing that Cramer events are actually 
exploitable. Second, while previous studies suggest a monotonous correction of the 
initial mispricing, we find that mispricing re-widens intraday.  
These complex intraday price patterns support findings from theoretical 
studies on limits to arbitrage. To correct a mispricing, arbitrageurs have to coordinate 
their efforts (Abreu & Brunnermeier, 2002). For a rational arbitrageur, who 
anticipates that short-term noise traders overwhelm arbitrageurs and exacerbate a 
mispricing, engaging in this destabilizing speculation is a rational strategy (De Long 
et al., 1990). Piccione & Spiegler (2014) extend this model and argue that forward-
looking arbitrageurs can both exacerbate mispricing and reduce it, depending on the 
circumstances. In reality, instead of one archetypical rational arbitrageur, there are 
different levels of arbitrageur sophistication (Milian, 2015). The live trading results in 
this essay support this, as part of its profits stem from timing the market better than an 
assumed “average arbitrageur”. Thus, its profits are “paid” not only by irrational retail 
investors, but also by suboptimal strategies of less sophisticated arbitrageurs. 
This suggests two questions for future research. First, do other mispricings re-
widen intraday? And second, can we show – ideally with actual trading data from 
brokers – that arbitrageurs coordinate and compete for profits by timing their actions? 
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3. Essay 3 – High Frequency Trading Intensifies Intraday Extreme 
Events in Stock Returns 
This study adds empirical evidence to the ongoing debate between researchers, 
regulators and market participants on the role and impact of HFT. Market quality is 
the focus of this debate, which examines the impact of HFT activity on measures of 
market efficiency and price discovery, trading costs and liquidity, and volatility and 
extreme events in stock prices. This essay focuses on the latter and makes two 
contributions: First, introducing a measure of intraday extreme events which captures 
unusually large price moves in periods of up to one hour. Second, showing 
empirically that HFT causes and contributes to these large price changes. This lends 
empirical support to theoretical models and reports by market participants suggesting 
numerous mechanisms by which HFT could cause intraday extreme events. 
Recent published and working papers contribute to this debate on whether 
HFT dampen or contribute to large short-term price moves. Brogaard et al. (2015). 
find that during the top 0.01% largest 10-second price moves high-frequency traders 
act as net liquidity suppliers, while non-high-frequency traders act as net liquidity 
demanders. Moreover, high-frequency traders are active liquidity providers during 
price jumps that result in permanent price changes, absorbing the most informed order 
flow. This implies that in the very short-term, HFT market making strategies might be 
dominant and therefore reduce volatility. However, this does not necessarily 
contradict our findings. First, our research question is on the effect of HFT on 
intraday extreme events of up to one hour in duration, i.e. a timeframe 600 times as 
long. Van Kervel & Menkveld (2015) show that time makes a difference. High 
frequency traders lean against institutional orders initially, which dampens very short-
term volatility. Yet for longer-lasting institutional orders, HFTs jump the bandwagon 
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and trade in the direction of the order, competing for liquidity, and exacerbating its 
price impact. Second, results also differ by the source of the data sample. Caivano 
(2015) investigates the trading activity of 14 identified HFT firms and investment 
banks with significant HFT activity in large Italian stocks and shows that they cause 
volatility increases for measurement periods from 10 seconds to 10 minutes. The 
authors also point out that the method of identifying HFT activity can impact results. 
If one particular HFT strategy dominates the activity measure, identified effects of 
HFT will reflect this potential bias. Both the U.S. SEC (2014) and (Foucault & Biais, 
2014) point out that the sample used by Brogaard et al. (2015) might be biased 
towards volatility dampening HFT market making strategies. 
The issue of welfare effects from HFT and the appropriate response via 
regulation and alternative market designs is gaining traction in the literature. The 
current environment leads to a suboptimal equilibrium in which HFT firms engage in 
a costly technological arms race for speed, resulting in overinvestment in technology 
which does not create any societal benefit (Biais et al., 2015). In her review of HFT 
market microstructure, O’Hara (2015) calls for changes that restore fairness in trading 
between HFTs and non-HFTs. Recent studies propose alternative market designs that 
would restore fairness and end the technological arms race: First, by simply 
introducing a delay of a few milliseconds for all orders (Baldauf & Mollner, 2015), 
and second, by moving towards frequent batch auctions several times per second 
rather than trading in continuous time (Budish et al., 2015). 
To determine the impact of HFT unequivocally and conclude the HFT debate, 
future research should full use order book data and a sample of actual orders by a 
representative set of HFT firms which covers all different forms of HFT strategies. 
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